이사의 회사에 대한 책임에 관한 독일의 최근 현황과 개정논의
Recent Developments and Reform Discussions on Directors’ Duties and Liabilities in Germany
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초록
본 논문은 독일 주식법이 보여주고 있는 이사의 책임의 특성과 최근의 이사 책임에 관한 개정 논의를 다루었다. 특징적이고 시사점을 주는 내용을 요약하면 다음과 같다. 회사와 관계를 맺고 있는 다양한 이해관계자의 다원적 이익을 함께 고려하여야 하는 기업 이익 원칙이 이사의 행위 원칙으로 여전히 기능하고 있다. 주식법 제93조 제2항이 규정하고 있는 이사의 책임은 이사가 기관의 지위를 취득함으로써 발생하는 법정책임으로 보며, 주식법 제93조 제2항은 강행 규정이기 때문에 책임을 정관이나 계약에 의해 완화하거나 강화할 수 없다. 주의의무위반으로 판단되는 행위와 손해의 발생 및 범위, 이사의 행위와 손해 사이의 인관관계는 회사(주주)가 입증을 하여야 하고, 면책을 원하는 이사는 주의의무위반이 없었거나 혹은 과실이 없었음을 또는 주의의무위반이 없었어도 손해가 발생하였을 것임을 입증하여야 한다(입증책임의 전환). 학설과 판례(ARAG/Garmenbeck 판결)에 의해 인정되던 경영판단의 원칙을 주식법 제93조 제1항 제2문에 명문 규정으로 도입하였고, 경영판단의 요건이 충족되면 이사의 의무위반이 부인되며, 요건 충족여부에 대해서는 이사가 입증책임을 부담한다. 충실의무에 대해서는 재량사항이 아니하는 이유로, 법적 판단에 대해서도 비재량적이고 구속적인 결정임을 이유로 경영판단의 원칙을 적용하지 않고 있다. 감독이사회는 이사의 회사에 대한 책임이 발생하면 원칙적으로 책임추궁의무가 있으며, 예외적으로 손해배상책임추궁이 회사의 이익에 반하는 중대한 사유가 있는 경우에 한하여 예외적으로 손해배상책임을 추궁하지 않을 수 있다(ARAG/Garmenbeck 판결). 금융위기 이후 이사의 법령준수의무가 매우 강조되고 있고, 특히 준법감시의무는 드라마틱한 Siemens/Neubürger 판결을 통해 이사의 핵심의무로 등장하고 있다. 법률전문가의 자문에 의존한 법적 판단이 사후적으로 법령위반이 된 경우 독립적이고 전문성 있는 법률전문가에게 자문사항에 대한 충분한 정보를 제공하여 얻은 자문을 타당성 검토를 거쳐 신뢰한 경우에만 회피불가능한 법률의 착오가 인정되어 이사의 책임이 발생하지 않는 것으로 본다(ISION 판결). 객관적 주의의무를 매우 넓게 파악하고 있어서 주의의무위반이 쉽게 인정되고, 단순한 경과실에 대해서도 이사의 책임이 인정되며, 책임 제한 가능성이 차단되어 있고, 의무위반과 관련하여 이사가 입증책임을 부담하며, 임원배상책임보험 체결 시 이사의 자부담의무가 있고, 이사에 대한 손해배상청구권의 포기나 화해도 엄격한 요건 하에서만 허용되는 등 주식법상 이사의 책임이 너무 가혹하다는 평가가 많아 현재 책임 제한에 대한 논의가 왕성하다.
Abstract
This article have touched the director's duties and liabilities under the Aktiengestz(german corporation law, hereinafter AktG) which is absolutely one of the most important legal problems in every jurisdiction. The article first explained the maxim for which the director should act. Under the german scholarship is the stakeholder value(Unternehmensinteresse) approach with duty to consider plural interests of the corporation's constituencies all together still dominating despite it's argumentative weakness. It is also in the line with the german federal supreme court(BGH), but contrary to the dominating shareholder value approach of the U.S. In conducting business the members of the management board must observe duties of care, loyalty and legality owed primarily to the corporation, not to its shareholders. The duty of legality which means to comply with applicable law is more strongly accentuated after the financial crisis in the end of 2000. The standard of care is that of a diligent conscientious manager[Sec. 93(1) sentence 1 AktG]. The directors shall bear the burden of proof as to whether or not they have employed the care of a diligent and conscientious manager, which is very characteristic in the german directors' liabilities and called as devil's proof because of de facto impossibility to counter prove. While the duty of care aims on the one hand at constraining the problem of mismanagement by director(agent problem), on the other at granting the directors margin of discretion for reasonable risk-taking, duty of loyalty prevents the directors from pursuing their private benefits in conflict with those of the corporation. The directors’ liability even for simple negligence because of a breach of the above mentioned duties is unlimited, under the Sec. 93 AktG with mandatory character there is no way to limit or waiver the directors' liability ex ante per inserting a limitation or waiver clause in the corporate charter or by the employment contract. According to the Sec. 93(1) sentence 2 AktG the directors shall not be deemed to have violated their duty if, at the time of managerial decision, they reasonably believed that they were acting on the basis of adequate information for the benefit of the company without conflict of interest(safe harbour, german business judgment rule). The german business judgment rule with aim to address over-deterrence and risk aversion following the ARAG/Garmenbeck Decision 1997 of BGH was codified 2005 in the Sec. 93(1) sentence 2 AktG. The german business judgment rule is only applicable to the duty of care, but not to the duty of loyalty and the duty of legality. Contrary to the powerful presumption of business judgment in favor of the directors in the Delaware Court Decision the Sec. 93(2) sentence 2 AktG shifts the burden of proof for the threshold requirements of the rule to the directors. The D&O insurance covering the risks of a member of the management board is legally allowed, but in order to address moral hazard it should provide for a deductible of no less than 10 per cent of the damages up to at least an amount equal to 1.5 times the fixed annual compensation of the management board member[Sec. 93(2) sentence 3 AktG]. The authority to enforce claims against the management is divided between the supervisory board, individual shareholders and creditors. After the iconic “ARAG/Garmenbeck" decision 1997 of the BGH the supervisory board is bound to enforce claim against the liable director. There are very narrow exceptions for the supervisory board discretion not to enforce liability claim, only when important interests of the corporation outweigh the benefit of the enforcing the claim. The ISION decision 2011 of the BGH can not be unsaid. In this decision the BGH held the director for not liable by virtue of the so called unavoidable error of law when he made a legal decision afterwards violating the law, relying on the advice given by an independent, informed and competent lawyer. The Siemens/Neubürger decision 2014 of the BGH with emphasis on the compliance duty to establish effectively operating internal control system to prevent corrupt practices is also one of the most remarkable and seminal leading case about director’s liability. The current discussion to reform is concentrating on the limitation of the director’s liability and the establishment of the more effective enforcement mechanism. The latter reform aims at promoting a more active role of the supervisory board to pursue liability claims by eliminating the conflict of interests with the management board. Among the various alternatives toward the limitation it is mostly accepted to admit inserting liability imitation into the corporate charter. In conclusion the directors’ liability scheme under the AktG seems like to be too strict compared with the main jurisdictions, especially in both the unlimited liability and the burden of proof to comply the directors’ duty. In the author’s careful eye the time and cause to reform directors’ liability in germany is due and sufficient.
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