니체의 관점주의에 대한 로티의 해석

Abstract

The main purpose of this paper is to critically analyze Rorty’s claim that Nietzsche betrays his own perspectivism by seeking after the historical sublimation and to propose possibility of “embodied perspectivism.” Nietzsche grasps the necessity of nihilism from the history of Western metaphysics, and he finds the possibility of overcoming nihilism from the logic of the history out of which it arises. By contrast, Rorty, rejecting the very idea of necessity,sees nihilism just as an accidental phenomenon. Thus, Rorty argues that we do not need to bother about overcoming nihilism at all. The difference between Nietzsche and Rorty on nihilism eventually leads to different views on perspectivism. While Nietzsche sees perspectivism as an active means to overcome nihilism, Rorty sees it as an inactive condition of contingent life. Rorty wants to see only the marginal and parasitic aspects of Nietzsche’s perspectivism. Rorty’s argument is grounded in his implicit dichotomy, in which we are to sway back into a form of universalism as soon as we accept any notion of a basis. However, Rorty’s radical renunciation of the notion of the basis gives rise to a self-contradiction, in which he cannot locate the very ground of his own criticism. I tried to show that the experientialist account of the notion of “the embodied conceptual system” offers us a viable way of reading Nietzsche’s perspectivism, while showing how Rorty’s dichotomous fear is ungrounded. The experientialist account of the nature of “the embodied experience,”largely drawing on the empirical findings of cognitive science, emphasizes the centrality of the body in forming our conceptual system. This view seems to offer the necessity and possibility of reading Nietzsche’s perspectivism as a form of “embodied perspectivism.”