법과 통화정책 - 어느 실무가의 메모
A Practitioner's Note on Law and Monetary Policy
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The pursuit of central banking can be in harmony with the goals of law. Legal perspectives in central banking derive their rationale and significance from the closely related nature of these two areas. In recent years, there has come a practical recognition that central banking requires an interdisciplinary approach; modern monetary policy has become a task requiring the contemplation from an overall perspective of economic, socio-political, human, and other such factors; central bank policy-makers are faced more seriously than ever before with the issue of the institutional framework. Markets are crucially underpinned both by the monetary system and by the legal system which are represented by the central bank and the supreme court, respectively. In effect, a cross study of institutional arrangements could be addressed with respect to comparative perspectives. American institutions possess more goal independence than European institutions in that they have greater discretion to act between multiple conflicting pursuits. The American model and the European model both have their particular pros and cons, in terms of democracy, efficiency, independence, accountability, transparency, and politicization, leaving room for compromise among these diverse values, particularly with regard to the institutional design. Approaches to central banking and law may be concerned with three essential and ultimate consequences of central banking: monetary policy objectives, monetary policy instrumentalities, and central bank governance. From these concerns implications can be derived for the institutional design.
Abstract
The pursuit of central banking can be in harmony with the goals of law. Legal perspectives in central banking derive their rationale and significance from the closely related nature of these two areas. In recent years, there has come a practical recognition that central banking requires an interdisciplinary approach; modern monetary policy has become a task requiring the contemplation from an overall perspective of economic, socio-political, human, and other such factors; central bank policy-makers are faced more seriously than ever before with the issue of the institutional framework. Markets are crucially underpinned both by the monetary system and by the legal system which are represented by the central bank and the supreme court, respectively. In effect, a cross study of institutional arrangements could be addressed with respect to comparative perspectives. American institutions possess more goal independence than European institutions in that they have greater discretion to act between multiple conflicting pursuits. The American model and the European model both have their particular pros and cons, in terms of democracy, efficiency, independence, accountability, transparency, and politicization, leaving room for compromise among these diverse values, particularly with regard to the institutional design. Approaches to central banking and law may be concerned with three essential and ultimate consequences of central banking: monetary policy objectives, monetary policy instrumentalities, and central bank governance. From these concerns implications can be derived for the institutional design.
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