開港期 朝鮮 主權論 衝突
Conflicts of Sovereignty Theories over Korea during the Open-Door Period
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Abstract
113) Japan had held aloof from China since the end of Tang dynasty while maintaining equal neighborly relationship with Korea in the hierarchical East Asian world order. Japan insisted on inserting a significant sentence in Art. 1 of the Treaty of Friendship Commerce and Navigation with Korea in 1876, stipulating that Korea being an autonomously independent country has equal rights as Japan. The significant wording raised suspicion from China wherein Japan would not recognize her tributary suzerainty over Korea. China had regarded Korea as the most important tributary state since the inauguration of the hierarchical system following confucian wisdoms for a paternal world order. The purpose of the Chinese good offices in helping Korea to conclude FCN treaties with the western powers like the U.S. was to protect Korea against any evil influence from Russia through the northern strip of frontiers by winning possible concerted supports from them. The Chinese tenacious efforts to have Korea and the U.S. stipulate the traditional tributary ties with China in the FCN treaty turned out to be unsuccessful. She was only able to make the U.S. accept a letter from the Korean King stating the tributary ties with her. Not far from the conclusion of the Korean American treaty, China started to intervene in the domestic affairs of Korea in order to curb the then engulfing influence from Japan. China successfully crushed down a pro-Japanese coup in 1884. She even urged the first permanent Korean mission to the U.S. in 1888 to follow certain courteous rules designated by China, such as by presenting credentials to the President guided by the Chinese minister. The Korean minister did not follow such a preposterous request, neither would the U.S. allow to do so. Korea had to respond to the Chinese inquiries over the non-performance. Mr. Yoo Kil-joon, the author of Seoyoo-gyonmoon, the then first monograph over the West, and an assistant to the first temporary Korean mission to the U.S. four years ago, advised the Korean court to make a series of recalcitrant replies to the Chinese inquiries. However, he stated in his book above that he would not mind the tributary system as long as China would not intervene in the domestic and diplomatic affairs of Korea in accordance with the tradition. The Chinese ties were eventually severed by Japan by the latter winning the Sino-Japanese war in 1894. The Peace Treaty of Shimonoseki in May of the following year declared that China should recognize the independent autonomy of Korea, and that she should also cede Taiwan and Penghu islands to Japan. However, a careful perusal of the significant clause would reveal that it does not guarantee Korean independence at all, for it only stated that China should recognize that Korea is to be independently autonomous. Thus Japan misled Korea into the path of her suzerainty by degrading Korea as a de facto protectorate. The Korean King along with the ministers contributed a swear of independence of the kingdom to the ancestors at the royal cemetery in early 1895, and announced fourteen articles for a new administration, the first of which declared that she would sever the ties with China. On October 8, the Japanese forces swarmed into the Korean court and killed the Queen Min. The Japanese aim was to sever the ties with Russia that was being grown by the superb lady for a possible balance of power over the peninsula. The saga of the pathetic rivalry over Korea during the imperialistic period has shown that international law may not be a body of law to depend upon by a relatively small country like Korea surrounded by relatively big powers, but it could only be an instrument for a possible use in achieving independence by building up one's own strength along with possible concerted supports from friendly countries. This has turned up to a Korean adage: international law is less worthy than a big gun.
