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이사의 충실의무의 체계화에 관한 연구

A Study on the Systematization of the Director’s Duty of Loyalty

유영일
한국상사판례학회 (The Korea Commercial Cases Association)|2013.12|상사판례연구 (Commercial Cases Review)|제26권 제4호|pp. 311-359|DOI 10.22864/kcca.2013.26.4.007

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참고문헌

키워드

자기거래충실의무회사기회유용systematizationduty of loyaltyfiduciary duty신임의무일반규정체계화usurpation of corporate opportunitygeneral provision개별규정상법 제382조의3 경업금지individual provisionart.382-3 of Commercial Codeprohibition of competitive transactionself dealing
주제분류법학

초록

1. necessity of systematizationKorean Law has a different fiduciary duty system about director, trustee and financial institutions. Even Korean Commercial Law has two types of provision about director’s duty of loyalty. The one is catch-all provision(Art.382-3), and the others are individual provisions, such as Art.388, 397, 397-2, 398. As a result, director’s duty of loyalty is not systematized in Korean Law, and many problems resulting from “conflict of provisions” are happened. (1) requirement of approvalOver 2/3 approval of all the directors is necessary in the self-dealing transactions and in the usurpation of the corporate opportunity. However approval of the majority of the directors is necessary in the competitive transactions. Considering that all of these transactions have the similar possibility of conflict of interests, there should be no need to regulate differently in requirement of approval of the board of directors. (2) effects of the breach of the duty of loyaltyCorporation could exercise an intervention rights(disgorgement of profits) when directors breach the duty of competitive transactions. However in case of breach of the other duty of loyalty, corporation have only the claims for damages and dismissal rights for directors. And in case of usurpation of corporate opportunity, damages of the corporation are presumed. On the other hand, restitution of profits are required in Korean Trust Law. In considering the consistency of legislation, restitution of profits should be allowed in all of the cases of the breach of the duty of loyalty 2. significance of catch-all provisions(Art.382-3)(1) standard of interpretation of individual provisionsBecause art.382-3 is a catch-all provisions of the director’s duty of loyalty, it serves as a standard of interpretation of the individual provisions concerning director’s duties of loyalty. In interpreting the individual provisions, the purpose of legislation, requirement and effects of the art.382-3 should be reflected. So In requirement, director’s purpose and corporation’s damages be not put stress on, and in effects disgorgement of profits be given in all of the cases of breach of duty of loyalty. (2) regulation of conflict of interests acts lack of individual provisionsAs a catch-all provisions, art.382-3 could regulate all of the breach of duties of loyalty which lack of individual provisions in Commercial Law. In interpretation, director’s duties of loyalty could be required, in case of ①insider trading, ②transfer of control, ③oppression of minority shareholders, and ④defensive tactics against the hostile M&A. Also director’s conflict of interests which could not be regulated with art.397, art.397-2, and art.398 could be regulated with art.382-3. For example, when directors are engaged in the transactions with their corporations which could not be included in the “line of business” of art.397, it does not constitute the breach of duty of prohibition of competitive transactions, In this case, there is no way but applying art.382-3 of the Commercial Law. 3. case lawRecently, Korean Supreme Court is applying the Art.382-3 directly as a reference provision in the cases which deals with the director’s responsibility. However the cases which involves the issue of breach of duty of loyalty could not be found. It is the writer’s opinion that director’s duty of loyalty should be distinguished with duty of care in case law. And in the near future, the Korean Supreme court is expected to take the same position.

Abstract

1. necessity of systematizationKorean Law has a different fiduciary duty system about director, trustee and financial institutions. Even Korean Commercial Law has two types of provision about director’s duty of loyalty. The one is catch-all provision(Art.382-3), and the others are individual provisions, such as Art.388, 397, 397-2, 398. As a result, director’s duty of loyalty is not systematized in Korean Law, and many problems resulting from “conflict of provisions” are happened. (1) requirement of approvalOver 2/3 approval of all the directors is necessary in the self-dealing transactions and in the usurpation of the corporate opportunity. However approval of the majority of the directors is necessary in the competitive transactions. Considering that all of these transactions have the similar possibility of conflict of interests, there should be no need to regulate differently in requirement of approval of the board of directors. (2) effects of the breach of the duty of loyaltyCorporation could exercise an intervention rights(disgorgement of profits) when directors breach the duty of competitive transactions. However in case of breach of the other duty of loyalty, corporation have only the claims for damages and dismissal rights for directors. And in case of usurpation of corporate opportunity, damages of the corporation are presumed. On the other hand, restitution of profits are required in Korean Trust Law. In considering the consistency of legislation, restitution of profits should be allowed in all of the cases of the breach of the duty of loyalty 2. significance of catch-all provisions(Art.382-3)(1) standard of interpretation of individual provisionsBecause art.382-3 is a catch-all provisions of the director’s duty of loyalty, it serves as a standard of interpretation of the individual provisions concerning director’s duties of loyalty. In interpreting the individual provisions, the purpose of legislation, requirement and effects of the art.382-3 should be reflected. So In requirement, director’s purpose and corporation’s damages be not put stress on, and in effects disgorgement of profits be given in all of the cases of breach of duty of loyalty. (2) regulation of conflict of interests acts lack of individual provisionsAs a catch-all provisions, art.382-3 could regulate all of the breach of duties of loyalty which lack of individual provisions in Commercial Law. In interpretation, director’s duties of loyalty could be required, in case of ①insider trading, ②transfer of control, ③oppression of minority shareholders, and ④defensive tactics against the hostile M&A. Also director’s conflict of interests which could not be regulated with art.397, art.397-2, and art.398 could be regulated with art.382-3. For example, when directors are engaged in the transactions with their corporations which could not be included in the “line of business” of art.397, it does not constitute the breach of duty of prohibition of competitive transactions, In this case, there is no way but applying art.382-3 of the Commercial Law. 3. case lawRecently, Korean Supreme Court is applying the Art.382-3 directly as a reference provision in the cases which deals with the director’s responsibility. However the cases which involves the issue of breach of duty of loyalty could not be found. It is the writer’s opinion that director’s duty of loyalty should be distinguished with duty of care in case law. And in the near future, the Korean Supreme court is expected to take the same position.

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