로티의 퍼트남의 실용주의적 전회

Abstract

The main purpose of this paper is to show the viability of Dewey's pragmatism by comparing it with Rorty's “pragmatism without methodology" and Putnam's “pragmatic enlightenment". Rorty and Putnam both have recourse to Dewey's pragmatism in criticizing the basic assumptions of traditional philosophy, especially of modern epistemology. In this sense, they both take part in “the pragmatic turn," which is seen as a viable alternative to the dilemmas of “the Linguistic Turn" in the early 20th century. Nevertheless, intentionally or not, both of Rorty's and Putnam's versions of pragmatism betray Dewey's conception of pragmatism, and thus giving rise to serious problems which Dewey would not have. Rorty ignores the importance of the empirical method, while Putnam ignores the principle of continuity, both of which serve as the very foundations of Dewey's pragmatism. Their moves do not just lead themselves away form Dewey's pragmatism, but undermine the viability of it. By drawing on the evidence from recent empirical researches, especially from cognitive science, I will suggest that returning to Dewey will give us better ground for the open-ended philosophical discourses in the post-analytic age.