The Allocation of Authority and Information Revelation
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We study the allocation of authority and the possibility of information revelation in aprincipal-agent model where the principal faces both problems of adverse selection andmoral hazard. We find that the consideration for information asymmetry and effortincentive for the agent makes the principal more likely delegate. Interestingly, we find thatthe informed agent has an ex-ante incentive to commit to reveal his information to theprincipal voluntarily if the information is hard.
Abstract
We study the allocation of authority and the possibility of information revelation in aprincipal-agent model where the principal faces both problems of adverse selection andmoral hazard. We find that the consideration for information asymmetry and effortincentive for the agent makes the principal more likely delegate. Interestingly, we find thatthe informed agent has an ex-ante incentive to commit to reveal his information to theprincipal voluntarily if the information is hard.
참고문헌 (10)
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