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WHY DO NATIONS BEHAVE STRATEGICALLY? : A GAME THEORETIC ANALYSIS OF GATT ARTICLE XXⅢ
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GATT 第10條 分析: 自由貿易과 主權行事와의 均衡을 찾아서이윤정법무부 · 국제법무연구2006 · 제67호DYNAMIC TRADE POLICY GAME UNDER IMPERFECT FACTOR MOBILITYKWAN-HOKIM한국경제학회 · The Korean Economic Review2003 · 제19권 제1호A Review of Economic Analyses on the World Trade OrganizationJee-Hyeong Park대외경제정책연구원 · East Asian Economic Review2002 · 제6권 제1호Is a Threat of Countervailing Duties Effective in Reducing Illegal Export Subsidies?강문성한국국제통상학회 · 국제통상연구2013 · 제18권 제2호The Most Favored Nation Principle: Passive Constraint or Active Commitment?남시훈, 서정민, 심승규한국경제학회 · The Korean Economic Review2016 · 제32권 제1호The Impact of Incomplete Information under Bilateral and Multilateral Trade Policy Coordination김영한한국경제학회 · The Korean Economic Review2004 · 제20권 제1호
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