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The Tracing Procedure in a Population Game Model

김용관
한국경제학회 (The Korean Economic Association)|2005.12|The Korean Economic Review|제21권 제2호|pp. 179-202

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참고문헌

주제분류경제학

초록

Abstract

The paper provides an evolutionary game theoretic reinterpretation of Harsanyi's (1975) tracing procedure and introduces a new solution concept for a population game model. In our population game theoretic interpretation players' common prior is the initial population state, and the tatonnement process is not a mental process but a gradual change of the population state. The population dynamic guarantees convergence to a Nash equilibrium, since its limit point is the same as the Nash equilibrium in the original tracing procedure. We also use the population tracing procedure repeatedly to define a refinement of Nash equilibria and call the limit set under the iterated population tracing procedure a ‘population stable set' (PSS below). It is shown that a PSS always exists and that Swinkels’ (1992) equilibrium evolutionarily stable set is a PSS.

참고문헌 (21)

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