PRINCIPLE OF TARGETING IN ENVIRONMENTAL TAXATION
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This paper re-examines Sandmo’s (1975) celebrated “additive property”and the principle of targeting in environmental taxation. It argues that, in the absence of direct emission taxes, one cannot in general divide commodity taxes into two mutually exclusive separate components of Pigouvian externality-correcting and Ramsey revenue-raising. Externality-correcting terms appear also in the expressions for the taxes on non-polluting goods–as well as in the expressions for taxes on the polluting goods–unless preferences are additively quasilinear either in one of the non-polluting goods or in the labor supply. On the other hand, in the presence of direct emission taxes, one can use emission taxes for externality correction and leave commodity taxes for revenue raising. Nevertheless the optimal emission tax is, in general, different from the marginal social damage of emissions.
Abstract
This paper re-examines Sandmo’s (1975) celebrated “additive property”and the principle of targeting in environmental taxation. It argues that, in the absence of direct emission taxes, one cannot in general divide commodity taxes into two mutually exclusive separate components of Pigouvian externality-correcting and Ramsey revenue-raising. Externality-correcting terms appear also in the expressions for the taxes on non-polluting goods–as well as in the expressions for taxes on the polluting goods–unless preferences are additively quasilinear either in one of the non-polluting goods or in the labor supply. On the other hand, in the presence of direct emission taxes, one can use emission taxes for externality correction and leave commodity taxes for revenue raising. Nevertheless the optimal emission tax is, in general, different from the marginal social damage of emissions.
참고문헌 (16)
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