미셸 푸코의 ‘자기주체화’와 ‘비판’에 대한 고찰

Abstract

The subject and the subjectivation are two main subjects which pass through the whole philosophy of Michel Foucault. Based on this assumption: “the man is not born as a subject, but become a subject as a result of experiences”, all his researches are focused on the subject in its relationship of knowledge, power and ethic. These three domains are closely connected as the experiences forming the subject. The ‘self-subjectivation’, in which the later research of Michel Foucault is specially interested, does not mean the subject which is composed of the power relationship, but the formation of the subject, with which a person gives a style to his life, and constructs himself by practicing the technique of the being. The ‘self-subjectivation’ is the ethical practices, with which the Ancients took care of themselves for their lives. They raised themselves as an ethical subject without compulsory regulation, and enjoyed the autonomy as the subject of their lives. In this context, ‘self-subjectivation’ is opposed to the heteronomous subjectivation, and signifies the experience of a subject formation, which precedes the notion itself of the subject. Another concept, in which this study is interested, is the critique, which is actually an another word signifying the parrhesia. But the critique differentiates from the parrhesia, in the sense that, if the latter requests the others, the former needs the ethical attitude toward oneself without the others. In other words, the critique is the possibility of ‘self-subjectivation’. Specially, the work which examines the theoretical meaning of Michel Foucault through his life, is another ethical model, because the philosophy means for him the critical work to the thoughts, of which the ultimate aim consists in the change of the self.