영화상영시장 및 국산영화 배급시장의동시과점적 수직계열화-독점규제법 상 ‘이윤압착’ 이론의 적용-

Abstract

In Korean film industry, CJ and Lotte two conglomerates hold the combined 70% of the theatre market by the number of screens controlled and the combined 40-60% of the film distribution market calculated by the box office revenues and the two companies have enforced various oppressive distribution conditions on non-affiliated distributors in the duration and number of showings, blank free admission tickets, virtual print fees, etc., on which the Korean Fair Trade Commission has taken disciplinary measures. However, some of these measures were cancelled in the ensuing judicial reviews and non-affiliated distributors and producers are still crying foul on freedom of business and cultural diversity. In this article, the author tries to legal analysis in terms of ‘abuse of bargaining power’ which KFTC has relied upon in the past but in terms of ‘monopolizing’. CJ and Lotte has structured the internal deals between their respective distribution arm and their theater harm intentionally to be disadvantageous to the distribution arm and demanded non-affiliated distributors to meet them. Their demands came with coercive power because they are acting in parallel with the combined market share of 70% of all screens and their demands are accepted for at least 40-60% of Korean films since the distribution arms of the two conglomerates distribute that much of the market. So, what started out as the conditions of self-dealing internal between a theater arm and a distributing arm of CJ and/or Lotte are established as ‘industry standard’ that non-affiliated distributors are forced to accept. No matter how lopsided these conditions do not hurt the conglomerates since the expenses of the distribution arm become the profit of the theater arm but they have hurt the non-affiliates and the number of commercially viable non-affiliate producers and distributors have gradually decreased over time. This behavior resembles ‘margin squeeze’ among monopolizing practices. In view of the 1948 Paramount decision of the U.S. Supreme Court, the Korean film market is much more concentrated than that of 1940’s of the Hollywood. We should consider adopting the ban on theater-distribution co-ownership ban or stoping the monopolizing practices either by stopping the parallel behavior of the two conglomerates or reducing the market share of each conglomerate either in theater market or distribution market to a label that their self-dealing conditions cannot have the force of ‘industry standard’. Looking outward, Korea seems to be the only market where two companies have such dominant position both in theater and in distribution.