A Security Analysis of a Key Management Scheme for PCS/SCADA Sensor Networks
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Process Control Systems (PCSs) or Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems have recently been added to the already wide collection of wireless sensor networks applications. The PCS/SCADA environment is somewhat more amenable to the use of heavy cryptographic mechanisms such as public key cryptography than other sensor application environments. The sensor nodes in the environment, however, are still open to devastating attacks such as node capture, which makes designing a secure key management challenging. Recently, Nilsson et al. proposed a key management scheme for PCS/SCADA, which was claimed to provide forward and backward secrecies. In this paper, we define four different types of adversaries or attackers in wireless sensor network environments in order to facilitate the evaluation of protocol strength. We then analyze Nilsson et al. 's protocol and show that it does not provide forward and backward secrecies against any type of adversary model.
Abstract
Process Control Systems (PCSs) or Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems have recently been added to the already wide collection of wireless sensor networks applications. The PCS/SCADA environment is somewhat more amenable to the use of heavy cryptographic mechanisms such as public key cryptography than other sensor application environments. The sensor nodes in the environment, however, are still open to devastating attacks such as node capture, which makes designing a secure key management challenging. Recently, Nilsson et al. proposed a key management scheme for PCS/SCADA, which was claimed to provide forward and backward secrecies. In this paper, we define four different types of adversaries or attackers in wireless sensor network environments in order to facilitate the evaluation of protocol strength. We then analyze Nilsson et al. 's protocol and show that it does not provide forward and backward secrecies against any type of adversary model.
참고문헌 (13)
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