보상제도가 자유계약선수 선택과 연봉계약에 미치는영향
On the Effects of the Compensation Rule on the Free Agent Decision and the Salary Level
0
조회
0
다운로드
4
인용
0
참고문헌
키워드
초록
본 연구는 선수가 일정 기간 동안 동일한 구단과 계약하여야하는 보류조항(Reserve clause)과 그 기간이 지난 후 타 구단으로 이적할 수있는 자유계약(Free agency, FA)제도가 존재할 때, 보상제도가 구단이 FA 자격을 갖추게 될 선수에게 제시하는 연봉과 선수의 FA 선택 여부에 미치는 영향을 분석한다. 이를 위해 5단계로 구성된 2기간 모형을 통해 2기에FA 자격을 갖게 되는 선수와 이 선수를 1기에 보유하고 있는 소속구단, 그리고 2기에 FA 신청 선수를 영입하고자 하는 구단들의 전략을 분석한다. 주된 결과는 다음과 같다. 첫째, 선수가 FA 신청 이전에 생산성에 걸 맞는연봉을 받고 있는 경우 FA를 신청할 유인은 없는 반면에 생산성과 최저연봉의 차이가 큰 경우 FA를 신청할 유인이 있다. 둘째, FA 신청이 예상되는경우 원소속구단은 보상제도를 이용하여 전략적으로 최저연봉보다 높게연봉을 제시한다(예비 FA 프리미엄). 셋째, 보상제도가 강할수록 FA 권리를 행사하는 선수는 줄어들게 되며, FA를 신청하더라고 선수가 받게 되는연봉이 감소한다.
Abstract
The reserve clause requires the players to have a salary contract with the same team for a fixed periods of time. The free agency system allows the players to move to the other teams after the fixed periods of time specified in the reserve clause. We consider the effects of the compensation rule on the free agency decision and salary level under the reserve clause and the free agency system. For this, we analyze a two-period model consisting of 5 stages. The main results are as follows. If a player receives a salary comparable to his productivity in the period before he can apply for FA, he has no incentive for applying for FA. With a large gap between the minimum salary and his productivity, he applies for FA. In this case, the incumbent club strategically pays an salary higher than the minimum one(expected FA premium) in order to take advantage of compensation rule which obligates the new club holding the FA player to pay the incumbent club several times of the previous salary. The stronger is the compensation rule, the less incentive the players has to apply for FA, and less salary they receive.
참고문헌 (12)
- Blass, A., "Does the baseball labor market contradict the human capital model of investment?", Review of Economics and Statistics, 74(2), pp.261~268 (1992)
- Cassing, J., "Implications of the auction mechanism in baseball’s free agent draft", Southern Economic Journal, 47(1), pp.110~121 (1980)
- Depken, C., "Free-agency and the competitiveness of major league baseball", Review of Industrial Organization, 14(3), pp.205~217 (1999)
- Kahn, L., "Free agency, long-term contracts and compensation in major league baseball : Estimates from panel data", Review of Economics and Statistics, 75, pp.157~164 (1993)
- Krautmann, A., "The dynamics of performance over the duration of major league baseball long-term contracts", Journal of Sports Economics, 10(1), pp.6~22 (2009)
- Miceli, T., "A Principal-agent model of contracting in major league baseball", Journal of Sports Economics, 5(2), pp.213~220 (2004)
- Miller, P. ., "A theoretical and empirical comparison of free agent and arbitration-eligible salaries negotiated in major league baseball", Southern Economic Journal, 67(1), pp.87~104 (2000)
- Rockerbie, D., "Strategic free agency in baseball", Journal of Sports Economics, 10(3), pp.278~291 (2009)
- Scully, G., "Pay and performance in major league baseball", American Economic Review, 64, pp.915~930 (1974)
- Stiroh, K., "Playing for keeps : Pay and performance in the NBA", Economic Inquiry, 45(1), pp.145~161 (2007)
- Vrooman, J., "The baseball players’ labor market reconsidered", Southern Economic Journal, 63(2), pp.339~360 (1996)
- Zimbalist, A., "Salaries and performance: Beyond the scully model, in Diamonds Are Forever: The Business of Baseball" (1992), Brookings