A Stag Hunt Game with Social Norms
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This paper studies a stag hunt game in which each player’s payoff depends on the level of social norms in a community. First, we establish conditions under which without social norms, there exists a unique equilibrium regarding the cooperation level, but with social norms, there can be multiple equilibria. Second, we provide the comparative statics analysis such that for a statics framework,the local stability of an interior equilibrium works as a sufficient condition under which the cooperation level increases as the degree of social norms increases;and for a dynamic framework, the cooperation level always increases with social norms.
Abstract
This paper studies a stag hunt game in which each player’s payoff depends on the level of social norms in a community. First, we establish conditions under which without social norms, there exists a unique equilibrium regarding the cooperation level, but with social norms, there can be multiple equilibria. Second, we provide the comparative statics analysis such that for a statics framework,the local stability of an interior equilibrium works as a sufficient condition under which the cooperation level increases as the degree of social norms increases;and for a dynamic framework, the cooperation level always increases with social norms.
참고문헌 (6)
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- Lindbeck, A., "Social norm and economic incentives in the welfare state", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114, pp.1~35 (1999)
- Ghosh, P., "Cooperation in community interaction without information flows", Review of Economic Studies, 63, pp.491~519 (1996)