공정거래법상 피해 대리변수로서의 관련매출액
Affected Commerce as a proxy for harm in the Korean Fair Trade Law
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The purpose of this paper is to probe into the critical question of whether the so-called 'affected commerce rule' is used as a proxy for harm in calculating the administrative surcharge. It is well known that most (both in monetary and criminal) sanctions by nature are based on harm in principle. However, as measuring the exact magnitude of harms is difficult, many countries, including Korea, have tried to find reasonable alternative proxies for calculating the harm. Therefore, if we can prove that other developed countries, which have apparently influenced the legislation or revision of the related substantive laws in Korea, are using a specific penalty (e.g., surcharges or civil fines) as a proxy for harm, then there will be a high likelihood that the same proxy in Korea is in fact being used for the identical purpose. This paper specifically focuses on the Korean Fair Trade Law, the reason being that the imposition of surcharges, both in frequency and scale, has been overwhelming especially in the area of antitrust and unfair trades. The paper is organized as follows. First, we examine the case of the United States because the country has deep-rooted history of antitrust laws. They have significantly influenced those of OECD and Korea. According to the United States Sentencing Guidelines, for example, the Department of Justice has employed 20 percent of the volume of affected commerce in lieu of the pecuniary loss. It is estimated that 10 percent for the average gain and another 10 percent for the average loss. Second, we scrutinize the OECD case because the Korea Fair Trade Commission, if indirectly, implied that it adopted the OECD's rationale and practice regarding the rule of measuring harm into the Korean Fair Trade Law. OECD strongly proposes 'affected commerce × percent (i.e., )' as a proxy for harm, the rationale of which is that is the simplest form which can approximate the 'unlawful gain' composed of unjust enrichment and any other harmful economic effects together. To summarize, Korea adopted the affected commerce's rule from OECD and United States as mentioned earlier. Also, it is obvious that both use the rule as a proxy for calculating harm. Therefore, one can conclude that it is most probable that the affected commerce rule has practically been used as a proxy for harm in Korea as well. Then, sooner or later it may be possible to calculate harm levels across violation types indeed, and also to make suggestions for improving the operation of administration surcharges. Hopefully, the law-and-economics arguments offered in this paper will, to a non-trivial degree, help the legislature and the judiciary in Korea has a more balanced view concerning the role and operation of the administrative surcharges in the ensuing future.
Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to probe into the critical question of whether the so-called 'affected commerce rule' is used as a proxy for harm in calculating the administrative surcharge. It is well known that most (both in monetary and criminal) sanctions by nature are based on harm in principle. However, as measuring the exact magnitude of harms is difficult, many countries, including Korea, have tried to find reasonable alternative proxies for calculating the harm. Therefore, if we can prove that other developed countries, which have apparently influenced the legislation or revision of the related substantive laws in Korea, are using a specific penalty (e.g., surcharges or civil fines) as a proxy for harm, then there will be a high likelihood that the same proxy in Korea is in fact being used for the identical purpose. This paper specifically focuses on the Korean Fair Trade Law, the reason being that the imposition of surcharges, both in frequency and scale, has been overwhelming especially in the area of antitrust and unfair trades. The paper is organized as follows. First, we examine the case of the United States because the country has deep-rooted history of antitrust laws. They have significantly influenced those of OECD and Korea. According to the United States Sentencing Guidelines, for example, the Department of Justice has employed 20 percent of the volume of affected commerce in lieu of the pecuniary loss. It is estimated that 10 percent for the average gain and another 10 percent for the average loss. Second, we scrutinize the OECD case because the Korea Fair Trade Commission, if indirectly, implied that it adopted the OECD's rationale and practice regarding the rule of measuring harm into the Korean Fair Trade Law. OECD strongly proposes 'affected commerce × percent (i.e., )' as a proxy for harm, the rationale of which is that is the simplest form which can approximate the 'unlawful gain' composed of unjust enrichment and any other harmful economic effects together. To summarize, Korea adopted the affected commerce's rule from OECD and United States as mentioned earlier. Also, it is obvious that both use the rule as a proxy for calculating harm. Therefore, one can conclude that it is most probable that the affected commerce rule has practically been used as a proxy for harm in Korea as well. Then, sooner or later it may be possible to calculate harm levels across violation types indeed, and also to make suggestions for improving the operation of administration surcharges. Hopefully, the law-and-economics arguments offered in this paper will, to a non-trivial degree, help the legislature and the judiciary in Korea has a more balanced view concerning the role and operation of the administrative surcharges in the ensuing future.
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