국내 자본시장 증권인수기능의 효율성에 관한 연구 : 은행계열과 비은행계열 금융기관 비교 분석
The Efficiency of Bank Underwriting of Corporate Securities in Korea
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자본시장법이 시행됨에 따라 은행과 증권회사 간 업무영역이나 활동 및 효율성에 큰 변화가 예견되고 있다. 본 연구는 자본시장에서 발행되는 채권의 인수활동에 있어서 인수기관이 상업은행(은행계열 금융기관)인가, 또는 투자은행(비은행계열 금융기관)인가에 따라 그 재무적 효과는 서로 다를 수 있다는 점에 착안하여 그 효과를 논하였다. 투자은행과 달리 상업은행은 발행기업과 대출거래를 통해 서로 연결되어 있기 때문이다. 실증연구를 통해 분석한 결과 은행계열 증권회사의 채권인수에서보다 비은행계열 증권회사가 채권을 인수하는 경우 벤치마크 수익률과 비교한 발행수익률 스프레드가 낮은 것으로 조사되었다. 또한 대규모기업집단 소속 증권사의 채권인수 표본에서 발행수익률 스프레드가 통계적으로 유의한 음(-)의 값을 보였는데, 이는 대규모기업집단 소속 증권회사일수록 계열기업의 채권발행이 빈번하게 이루어지므로 비록 동일집단 소속기업의 채권발행을 동일집단 계열증권회사가 인수하지 못하도록 되어 있지만 계열증권회사 간 발행에 있어서 평균적으로 수익률스프레드를 낮추는 것을 시사한다. 스프레드에 영향을 미치는 기업특성을 조사한 바에 의하면 총자산로그로 측정한 기업의 자산규모, 경영성과 및 현금흐름, 외국인 보유지분 및 우량 신용등급은 통계적으로 유의한 수준에서 수익률 스프레드를 낮추는 것으로 나타났다. 반면에 부채비율, 총부채 대비 회사채비율, 대주주지분 등의 변수는 수익률 스프레드를 확대시키는 것으로 분석되었다. 이 가운데 특이할만한 점은 대주주지분이 높은 기업일수록 수익률 스프레드가 높다는 것으로 대주주지분이 많을수록 그만큼 소액주주의 비율이나 기타 주주의 비율이 낮게 되므로 채권발행에 있어서 대주주의 대리인문제 등이 희석될 가능성이 높다는 것으로 해석할 수 있다. 채권발행에 있어서 외국인지분이 유의적인 작용을 한다는 것은 외국인 투자자의 역할이 채권시장에도 미치고 있음을 시사하는 결과이기도 한다. 대규모기업집단에 소속된 기업의 채권발행은 그렇지 않은 기업이 발행할 경우보다 유의적인 음(-)의 계수값을 보였다. 이는 대체로 이들 기업의 회사채가 시장에서 보다 긍정적으로 판매될 수 있음을 나타내는 것으로 판단된다
Abstract
In July 2007, Korean government has passed “The Capital Market and Financial Investment Services Act” to further develop the capital markets and the Act was to become effective in February 2009. Using a large sample of Korean firms, we have examined (i) the effect of underwriting activities on the firm value (bond spread) comparing commercial bank and investment bank, and (ii) the determinants of the firm value changes following underwriting activities of bank. To test our goal, we collected a wide range of samples of data for bond issuing activities executed by Korean firms listed on the Korea Stock Exchange (KSE) between 2000 and 2003. Our paper is distinguished from previous studies on this subject in a way that we analyzed the effect of corporate bond underwriting activities with regard to commercial banking and investment banking. Initially, we set up a hypothesis that “Certification View” and “Conflict-of-interest View” are major driving forces behind cross-firm differences in performance following bond issuance. We find that, in general, underwriting by investment bank (securities company) brings a positive effect on the firm value (spread between bench mark rate and bond issuing rate). This result indicates that firm value has been negatively affected by the bank underwriting and provides the evidence for “Conflict-of-interest View” in Korea. Our studies have also revealed that any change in firm value following bond issuance is positively related with the firm size (total asset), operating performance, liquidity (cashflow), and equity ownership by foreign investors. Overall, our results support the view that bank underwriting activities can play an important role in determining firm value and financial strategies under “The Capital Market and Financial Investment Services Act” of 2007.
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