Does Managerial Entrenchment Matter in Management Buyouts? Evidence from the Classified Board Provision
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Using a sample of 232 U.S. management buyout (MBO) announcements between 1995 and 2013, we examine whether the presence of the classified board provision affects shareholder wealth and firm performance around MBOs. Evidence shows that classified board provision is positively associated with stock returns around the time of the announcements. We examine whether the operational enhancements following MBOs result from ensuing corporate governance enhancement or private information appropriation. Controlling for firm characteristics, we find that firms with classified board provision show more pronounced improvements in operating performance between the pre- and post-announcement period, which is consistent with the private information appropriation. These findings suggest that entrenched managers have strong incentives to use private information and exploit the undervaluation of their firms when making buyout decisions.
Abstract
Using a sample of 232 U.S. management buyout (MBO) announcements between 1995 and 2013, we examine whether the presence of the classified board provision affects shareholder wealth and firm performance around MBOs. Evidence shows that classified board provision is positively associated with stock returns around the time of the announcements. We examine whether the operational enhancements following MBOs result from ensuing corporate governance enhancement or private information appropriation. Controlling for firm characteristics, we find that firms with classified board provision show more pronounced improvements in operating performance between the pre- and post-announcement period, which is consistent with the private information appropriation. These findings suggest that entrenched managers have strong incentives to use private information and exploit the undervaluation of their firms when making buyout decisions.
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