용수의 중도연기와 승조의 비유비무와 장자의 비비유비비무 비교연구
A Comparative Study of Middle-Way Dependent Origination in Nāgārjuna, Sengzhao’s Neither Existence nor Nonexistence, and Zhuangzi’s Neither-Negation of Existence nor Nonexistence
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This paper offers a comparative philosophical inquiry into Nāgārjuna and Sengzhao’s doctrine of “neither existence nor nonexistence”(非有非無) and Zhuangzi’s more radical formulation of “neither the negation of existence nor the negation of nonexistence”(非非有非非無). Focusing on Buddhist discussions of dependent origination, emptiness, and the Two Truths, the paper examines how Nāgārjuna’s Middle Way is received and transformed in Sengzhao’s Prajñā thought, particularly through the concepts of non-coming and non-going(不來不去), non-migration(不遷), and neither existence nor nonexistence. These Buddhist formulations are then placed in dialogue with Zhuangzi’s dialectical reflections on adaptive coming and going(適來適去) and his employment of paradoxical negation that transcends binary oppositions. The analysis argues that Sengzhao’s philosophy does not merely negate movement, existence, or causality, but articulates a dynamic interdependence between movement and stillness, saṃsāra and nirvāṇa, existence and emptiness. Zhuangzi’s thought, in turn, anticipates a similar logic through his rejection of fixed distinctions between being and non-being, affirmation and negation. By juxtaposing these traditions, the paper highlights a shared non-dualistic horizon in which conventional distinctions are neither absolutized nor dismissed, but reinterpreted as mutually implicative.
Abstract
This paper offers a comparative philosophical inquiry into Nāgārjuna and Sengzhao’s doctrine of “neither existence nor nonexistence”(非有非無) and Zhuangzi’s more radical formulation of “neither the negation of existence nor the negation of nonexistence”(非非有非非無). Focusing on Buddhist discussions of dependent origination, emptiness, and the Two Truths, the paper examines how Nāgārjuna’s Middle Way is received and transformed in Sengzhao’s Prajñā thought, particularly through the concepts of non-coming and non-going(不來不去), non-migration(不遷), and neither existence nor nonexistence. These Buddhist formulations are then placed in dialogue with Zhuangzi’s dialectical reflections on adaptive coming and going(適來適去) and his employment of paradoxical negation that transcends binary oppositions. The analysis argues that Sengzhao’s philosophy does not merely negate movement, existence, or causality, but articulates a dynamic interdependence between movement and stillness, saṃsāra and nirvāṇa, existence and emptiness. Zhuangzi’s thought, in turn, anticipates a similar logic through his rejection of fixed distinctions between being and non-being, affirmation and negation. By juxtaposing these traditions, the paper highlights a shared non-dualistic horizon in which conventional distinctions are neither absolutized nor dismissed, but reinterpreted as mutually implicative.
