미국연방대법원의 엄격심사기준의 기능과 이익형량에 관한 연구
A Study on the Function and the Weighted Balancing of the Strict Scrutiny Standard in the Supreme Court of the United States
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초록
미국 연방대법원의 위헌심사기준은 엄격심사와 합리성심사로 구분할 수 있다. 인종, 성별 등 차별금지 영역에서의 차별적 취급에 대해서는 엄격심사를 적용하여 위헌결정을 한다. 연방대법원의 엄격심사 기준은 판례를 통하여 점진적으로 형성되어 왔다. 엄격심사는 입법의 목적과 수단과의 합리적 관련성만으로 합헌으로 추정하는 것이 아니라 차별이 기본권을 침해하였는지, 위헌의 의심이 있는 차별(suspect classifications)인지, 중대한 공익의 목적이 있는지를 기준으로 합헌성 여부를 판단한다. 연방대법원은 특히 차별영역에서 입법목적을 이용하여 직접, 간접적으로 인종을 구분하는 법률은 위헌의 의심을 가지고 판단한다. 연방대법원은 이 판단과정에서 공익적 목적 여부를 판단하는 입법목적의 정당성 그리고 적용하는 수단이 공익목적과 상응하는지 여부를 판단하는 수단의 적합성을 판단한다. 이에 더하여 연방대법원은 입법목적의 정당성과 수단이 합리적, 실질적으로 연관성이 있는지, 그리고 적용하는 수단의 필요성과 최소한의 수단인지를 심사하는 기준을 확립하였다. 이러한 엄격심사 기준은 판단기준의 추상적 성격으로 인하여 연방대법관마다 적용하는 기준에 차이가 있다. 이 차이점을 기본적으로 분류하면 입법동기를 불문하고 엄격심사 사안을 헌법상 거의 금지한 경우(Nearly Categorical Prohibition), 본질적으로 강화된 형태의 이익형량(Weighted Balancing), 불법적 동기의 배제(Illicit Motive) 등으로 나눌 수 있다. 연방대법원의 엄격심사는 입법자와 국민에게 예측가능성과 법적 안정성의 실현이라는 근본적 목적에 충실한 판단기준이다. 이 장점을 제대로 살리기 위해서는 엄격심사기준을 그 취지에 맞게 적용하고 일관된 결론을 얻을 수 있어야 한다. 또한 입법자의 입법형성권을 존중하면서도 소수보호라는 헌법이념을 실현시킬 수 있어야 한다.
Abstract
The strict scrutiny standard in the Supreme Court of the United States can be divided into the stern review and the rationality review. Unconstitutionality is determined by applying strict judicial scrutiny in terms of the discriminative treatments in the anti-discrimination areas such as race and gender. The strict scrutiny standard in the Supreme Court has been gradually formed through precedents. The stern review is not what assumes it as constitutionality just with the rational relationship between an objective and a method of legislation, but judges the appearance of constitutionality based on whether discrimination violated the basic rights, whether it corresponds to the suspect classifications of unconstitutionality, and whether there is the purpose of a significant public interest. The Supreme Court judges it with the unconstitutional suspect as for the law of sorting race directly and indirectly through using the legislative objective especially in the discrimination area. In this judgment process, the Supreme Court judges the legislative justness of law, which decides the appearance of public-interest purpose, and the suitability of the means, which determines whether the applied means conforms to the public-interest objective. In addition to this, the Supreme Court established the standard of reviewing whether the justice and the means of the legislative objective have a reasonable and actual relation, and whether it is the minimum means along with the necessity of the applied means. In terms of this strict scrutiny standard, every Supreme Court has a difference in the standard of application owing to an abstract character of the judgment yardstick. Classifying this difference basically, it can be divided into the Nearly Categorical Prohibition from the stern review issue regardless of the legislative motive, the Weighted Balancing in the form of being substantially strengthened, and the exclusion of Illicit Motive. The strict scrutiny in the Supreme Court is the judgment standard that is loyal to the fundamental objective called the realization of the predictability and the legal stability in a legislator and people. To properly revive this merit, there is a need to apply the strict scrutiny standard in line with the purport and to possibly obtain a consistent conclusion. Also, the ideology of constitutional law dubbed the minority protection needs to be capable of being realized even while a lawmaker's legislative formation power is respected.
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