가맹사업에서의 로열티 결정요인과 효과에 대한 탐색적 연구
Determinants and Effects of Royalty in Franchise Business: An Exploratory Study
0
조회
0
다운로드
7
인용
0
참고문헌
키워드
초록
가맹금의 한 형태인 로열티는 가맹본부의 가장 중요한 수익원 중의 하나다. 본 연구는 로열티 부과여부의 결정요인과 로열티가 가맹사업에 미친 효과를 분석하고 있다. 2008년과 2016년 공정거래위원회에 등록된 정보공개서 자료를 토대로 가맹본부의 로열티 부과여부를 종속변수로 하는 로지스틱 회귀분석과 초기가입비, 최초공급상품비용을 종속변수로 하는 다중회귀분석 결과, 가맹점사업자가 직면하는 위험의 측정치 중 최초계약기간을 제외한 폐점비율이나 신규개점 점포 수, 계약종료 점포 수는 모두 로열티 부과여부나 대체수익원과 유의적인 관계를 맺지 않는 것으로 나타났다. 가맹사업자의 투입(역량) 측정변수 중 가맹점 평균매출은 기대와는 반대로 로열티 부과여부에 긍정적인 영향을 미치는 것으로 나타났으며, 가맹점사업자에 대한 모니터링비용을 측정하고 있는 점포의 지리적 분산은 로열티 부과여부나 대체수익원과 유의적 관련이 없는 것으로 나타났다. 가맹본부의 투입(역량) 변수인 브랜드 수와 영업개시소요일은 가설과 부합하게 로열티 부과에 긍정적 영향을 미치는 것으로 나타났다. 다만 총점포 수는 로열티 부과여부와 부정적 관계를 맺는 것으로 나타났다. 그밖의 가맹본부의 규모 및 재무성과와 관련된 변수는 로열티 부과여부에 영향을 미치지 않는 것으로 나타났다. 다만 일부 변수의 경우 대체수익원과 긍정정 관계를 맺는 것으로 나타났다. 로열티 효과측면에서 보면 로열티 부과여부는 기대와 달리 가맹본부의 생존여부와 관련을 맺지 않는 것으로 나타났으며, 가맹본부의 규모나 재무성과와도 대체로 관계가 없는 것으로 나타났다. 다만 초기가입비가 클수록 임직원 수나 가맹점수, 신규개점 수 등 일부 규모변수가 커지는 것으로 나타났다. 본 연구의 분석 결과는 로열티 관련 기존 이론 및 실증분석 결과와 상당히 배치된다. 이를 토대로 본 연구는 기존 이론과 방법론의 한계를 비판적 관점에서 재검토하고 있으며, 국내 프랜차이즈산업에서의 로열티 부과 현실에 대한 몇 가지 개선 방향을 제시하고 있다.
Abstract
Royalty, a form of required payments made by the franchisee, is one of the most important sources of revenue for the franchisor. This study with empirical evidence analyzes what factors determine the royalty and how it affects the franchise business. In this regard, existing studies have mainly explained the determinants and effects of royalty in terms of the agency theory. However, this empirical analysis does not firmly support the viewpoint of the agency theory. As a result of analyzing the information disclosure documents registered with the Korea Fair Trade Commission in 2008 and 2016, many of the hypotheses set by this study based on the agency theory are rejected. The logistic regression analysis on whether to impose royalty and the multiple regression analyses on the alternative sources of franchisor revenue, initial franchise fee and initial costs of goods supplied by the franchisor, are employed. Among independent variables, the ratio of outlet closure, the number of new outlets, and the number of terminated outlets, are not all significantly related to royalties or alternative revenue sources. The initial contract period was significantly related to whether to impose royalty. The average sales of the franchisee, a measure of the input (capacity) of the franchisee, has a positive effect on whether to impose royalty as opposed to expectations. The geographical dispersion of the stores measuring the costs of monitoring franchisee has no significant relationship between whether to impose royalty and alternative revenue sources. Among the variables measuring the input (capacity) of the franchisor, the number of brands and the pre-opening training period required for the commencement of store operation have a positive effect on the imposition of royalties in line with the hypothesis. Contrary to expectations, the total number of stores is found to have a negative relationship with the royalties. Other variables related to the size and financial performance of the franchisor do not affect whether the royalty was imposed. Some variables have positive relationships with sources of alternative revenue. On the other hand, with regard to the effect of royalties, this study is expected to have a positive impact on the viability, size, and financial performance of the franchisor. On the contrary, the results of the analysis show that the royalties are not related to the survival of the franchisor, and the size and the financial performance of the franchisor also are not related to it. However, the larger the initial franchise fee, the larger the number of franchisor employees, the smaller the number of franchised outlets, and the smaller the number of new outlets. The results of this study are quite contrary to the existing theoretical and empirical results for determining the factors and effects of royalty. Based on these findings, this study reviews the limitations of existing theories and methodologies that explain the royalty from a critical perspective and presents some improvement directions on the reality of royalties in Korean franchise industry. First, it is necessary to actively promote the introduction of the royalty system. For the domestic franchise industry, an urgent settlement of the royalty system is needed as a way to enhance the transparency and fairness of trade between franchisors and franchisees. The decision to determine the royalty rate at a certain level may involve disagreements with the current franchisees, so a rational basis should be provided and the procedure for obtaining consent must be accompanied. Second, royalties need to be levied even if there is an alternative source of revenue. It is reasonable to impose royalty separately from the supply of goods, as royalty is a price for ongoing services to franchisee and the use of trademarks. It will contribute to prevent any recent conflicts (eg, over-specification of mandatory purchases or excessive transfer price of required items). Third, franchisors with higher reputation and excellent business competence should be active in introducing the royalties system and restructuring the franchise industry. Fourth, it is necessary to positively consider increasing the initial contract period. If a franchisor plans to impose the royalty, it may be desirable to redesign the contract with a longer contract due, taking into account the initial investments made by the franchisee.
참고문헌 (29)
- 임영균, "로열티 제도 정착을 통한 국내 가맹본부의 수익구조 개선방안에 관한 연구", 유통연구, 23(3), pp.53~79 (2018), 한국유통학회[DOI]
- 진문근, "우리나라 프랜차이즈 산업의 로열티 부과 현황과 로열티 방식 전환에 관한 실효성 검토", 프랜차이징 저널, 4(1), pp.64~97 (2018), 한국프랜차이즈학회[DOI]
- Agrawal, D., "Contractual Arrangements in Franchising : An Empirical Investigation", Journal of Marketing Research, 32(2), pp.213~221 (1995)
- Arrunada, B., "Contractual Allocation of Decision Rights and Incentives : The Case of Automobile Distribution", Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 17(1), pp.256~283 (2001)
- Bhattacharyya, S., "Double-sided Moral Hazard and the Nature of Share Contracts", RAND Journal of Economics, 26, pp.761~781 (1995)
- Blair, R. D., "Optimal Franchising", Southern Economic Journal, 49(2), pp.494~505 (1982)
- Brickley, J. A., "Incentive Conflicts and Contractual Restraints", Journal of Law and Economics, 42(2), pp.745~774 (1999)
- Brickley, J. A., "Royalty Rates and Upfront Fees in Share Contracts : Evidence From Franchising", Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 18, pp.511~535 (2002)
- Brickley, J., "The Choice of Organization Form : the Case of Franchising", Journal of Financial Economics, 18(2), pp.401~420 (1987)
- Caves, R. E., "Franchising : Firms. Markets, and Intangible Assets", Southern Economic Journal, 42(4), pp.572~586 (1976)
- Elango, B., "Franchising Research : A Literature Review and Synthesis", Journal of Small Business Management, 35(3), pp.65~81 (1997)
- Fadairo, M., "Why Include Royalties in Distribution Contracts? Evidence from France", International Journal of Retail and Distribution Management, 41, pp.566~583 (2013)
- Gadde, L. E., "Activity Coordination and Resource Combining: Implications for Relationship Involvement and the Relationship Atmosphere", Journal of Marketing Management, 20(1, pp.2) (2004), 157~184
- Gadde, L. E., "Distribution Network Dynamics and the Consequences for Intermediaries", Industrial Marketing Management, 43, pp.622~629 (2014)
- Gallini, N., "Dual Distribution and Royalty Fees in Franchising", Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 8, pp.471~501 (1992)
- Lafontaine, F., "Agency Theory and Franchising: Some Empirical Results", Rand Journal of Economics, 23(Summer), pp.263~283 (1992)
- Lafontaine, F., "The Evolution of Franchising and Franchise Contracts : Evidence From the United States", Entrepreneurial Business Law Journal, 3(2), pp.382~434 (2009)
- Lafontaine, F., "Franchising Growth and Franchisor Entry and Exit in the U.S. Market: Myth and Reality", Journal of Business Venturing, 13, pp.95~112 (1998)
- Lal, R., "Improving Channel Coordination Through Franchising", Marketing Science, 9(4), pp.299~218 (1990)
- Lanchimba, C., "Entrepreneurial Orientation, Risk and Incentives : The Case of Franchising", Small Business Economics, 50(1), pp.163~180 (2018)
- Maruyama, M., "Franchise Fees and Royalties : Theory and Empirical Results", Review of Industrial Organization, 40, pp.167~189 (2012)
- Mathewson, G. F., "The Economics of Franchise Contracts", Journal of Law and Economics, 28(3), pp.503~526 (1985)
- Rubin, P., "The Theory of the Firm and the Structure of the Franchise Contract", Journal of Law and Economics, 21(1), pp.223~233 (1978)
- Sen, K. C., "The Use of Initial Fees and Royalties in Business Format Franchising", Managerial and Decision Economics, 14(2), pp.175~190 (1993)
- Shane, S. A., "Hybrid Organizational Arrangements and Their Implications for Firm Growth and Survival : A study of New Franchisors", Academy of Management Journal, 39, pp.216~234 (1996)
- Shane, S. A., "From Ice Cream to the Internet" (2005), Pearson Education Inc., Prentice Hall
- Shane, S. A., "New Firm Survival: Institutional Explanations for New Franchisor Mortality", Management Science, 45, pp.142~159 (1999)
- Shane, S. A., "Factors for New Franchise Success", Sloan Management Review, 39(3), pp.43~49 (1998)
- Vazquez, L., "Up-front Franchise Fees and Ongoing Variable Payments As Substitutes : An Agency Perspective", Review of Industrial Organization, 26(4), pp.445~460 (2005)
