Activation of Securities Class Actions in Korea: From a Procedural Perspective
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The purpose of opt-out class action is to give plaintiffs’ counsels incentives to file lawsuits in areas where individual person has difficulty in setting out a lawsuit. ‘Securities-related Class Action Act’(“SCAA”) in Korea was introduced on January 20th of 2004 with the same intention. But SCAA cases in Korea have rarely been filed and the number of cases since the act’s enforcement to date is only ten. This article analyses those 10 cases, and tries to grasp the causes of such listlessness, mainly from a procedural perspective. One of the pivotal reasons of the inactiveness seems to be the time consuming permission process, which generally takes more than 4 years even before starting the first session at first instance trial court. On the other hands, litigation costs, attorney-fee system or the lack of discovery system in SCAA might occupy some of the causes, but do not seem to be the main reasons. Although there would be no royal road to activate SCAA, this article tries to provide some ways to activate it. The first is to encourage the courts to change its attitude toward SCAA actions. The court should understand the difference between permission process and main process on merits, and why this kind of litigation is needed. Some minor factors, such as relaxation of the counsel requirements and reduction of member requirement would also be helpful.
Abstract
The purpose of opt-out class action is to give plaintiffs’ counsels incentives to file lawsuits in areas where individual person has difficulty in setting out a lawsuit. ‘Securities-related Class Action Act’(“SCAA”) in Korea was introduced on January 20th of 2004 with the same intention. But SCAA cases in Korea have rarely been filed and the number of cases since the act’s enforcement to date is only ten. This article analyses those 10 cases, and tries to grasp the causes of such listlessness, mainly from a procedural perspective. One of the pivotal reasons of the inactiveness seems to be the time consuming permission process, which generally takes more than 4 years even before starting the first session at first instance trial court. On the other hands, litigation costs, attorney-fee system or the lack of discovery system in SCAA might occupy some of the causes, but do not seem to be the main reasons. Although there would be no royal road to activate SCAA, this article tries to provide some ways to activate it. The first is to encourage the courts to change its attitude toward SCAA actions. The court should understand the difference between permission process and main process on merits, and why this kind of litigation is needed. Some minor factors, such as relaxation of the counsel requirements and reduction of member requirement would also be helpful.
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