KBS-3 방식 고준위방폐물 심층처분장 FEP 분석을 통한 국내 사용후핵연료심층처분시설 방사선학적 안전성 평가용 지권영역 주요 프로세스 항목 및상대적 중요도 도출
Draft List and Relative Importance of Principal Processes in the Geosphere to be Considered for the Radiological Safety Assessment of the Domestic Geological Disposal Facility through Analyzing FEPs for KBS-3 Type Disposal Repository of High-level Radioactive Waste (HLW)
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The deep geological repository of high-level radioactive waste shall be designed to meetthe safety objective set in the form of radiation dose or corresponding risk to protect human and theenvironment from radiation exposure. Engineering feasibility and conformity with the safety objectiveof the facility conceptual design can be demonstrated by comparing the assessment result using thecomputational model for scenario(s) describing the radionuclide release and transport from repositoryto biosphere system. In this study, as the preliminary study for developing the high-level radioactivewaste disposal facility in Korea, we reviewed and analyzed the entire list of FEPs and how to handleeach FEP from a general point of view, which are selected for the geosphere region in the radiologicalsafety assessment performed for the license application of the KBS-3 type deep geological repository inFinland and Sweden. In Finland, five FEPs (i.e., stress redistribution, creep, stress redistribution, erosionand sedimentation in fractures, methane hydrate formation, and salt exclusion) were excluded or ignoredin the radionuclide release and transport assessment. And, in Sweden, six FEPs (i.e., creep, surfaceweathering and erosion, erosion/sedimentation in fractures, methane hydrate formation, radiationeffects (rock and grout), and earth current) were not considered for all time frames and earthquake outof a total of 25 FEPs for the geosphere. Based on these results, an FEP list (draft) for the geosphere wasderived, and the relative importance of each item was evaluated for conducting the radiological safetyassessment of the domestic deep geological disposal facility. Since most of information on the disposalfacility in Korea has not been determined as of now, it is judged that all FEP items presented in Table 3should be considered for the radiological safety assessment, and the relative importance derived fromthis study can be used in determining whether to apply each item in the future.
Abstract
The deep geological repository of high-level radioactive waste shall be designed to meetthe safety objective set in the form of radiation dose or corresponding risk to protect human and theenvironment from radiation exposure. Engineering feasibility and conformity with the safety objectiveof the facility conceptual design can be demonstrated by comparing the assessment result using thecomputational model for scenario(s) describing the radionuclide release and transport from repositoryto biosphere system. In this study, as the preliminary study for developing the high-level radioactivewaste disposal facility in Korea, we reviewed and analyzed the entire list of FEPs and how to handleeach FEP from a general point of view, which are selected for the geosphere region in the radiologicalsafety assessment performed for the license application of the KBS-3 type deep geological repository inFinland and Sweden. In Finland, five FEPs (i.e., stress redistribution, creep, stress redistribution, erosionand sedimentation in fractures, methane hydrate formation, and salt exclusion) were excluded or ignoredin the radionuclide release and transport assessment. And, in Sweden, six FEPs (i.e., creep, surfaceweathering and erosion, erosion/sedimentation in fractures, methane hydrate formation, radiationeffects (rock and grout), and earth current) were not considered for all time frames and earthquake outof a total of 25 FEPs for the geosphere. Based on these results, an FEP list (draft) for the geosphere wasderived, and the relative importance of each item was evaluated for conducting the radiological safetyassessment of the domestic deep geological disposal facility. Since most of information on the disposalfacility in Korea has not been determined as of now, it is judged that all FEP items presented in Table 3should be considered for the radiological safety assessment, and the relative importance derived fromthis study can be used in determining whether to apply each item in the future.
참고문헌 (13)
- Nuclear Safety and Security Commission, "Enforcement Decree of the Nuclear Safety Act", Presidential Decree No. 31824, ~ (2021)
- Nuclear Safety and Security Commission, "Standards for Radiation Protection, and etc. Notice No. 2019-10", ~ (2019)
- Master Plan for Management of High-level Radioactive Waste(Draft), "Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy", ~ (2016)
- Nuclear Safety and Security Commission, "General Standards for the Deep Geological Disposal Facility of High-level Radioactive Waste", Notice No. 2021-21, ~ (2021)
- Safely in the ancient bedrock(First in the World–Final Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel to Begin in Finland), "Finnish Energy.", ~ (2021)
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- Posiva Oy., "Safety Case for the Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel at Olkiluoto – Synthesis 2012", POSIVA 2012-12, ~ (2013)
- The Swedish Radiation Safety Authority’s Regulations and General Advice Concerning Safety in Connection with the Disposal of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Waste, "SSM(Swedish Radiation Safety Authority)", SSMFS, 21~ (2008)
- The Swedish Radiation Safety Authority’s Regulations and General Advice Concerning the Protection of Human Health and the Environment in Connection with the Final Management of Spent Nuclear Fuel and Nuclear Waste, "SSM(Swedish Radiation Safety Authority)", SSMFS, 37~ (2008)
- FEP Report for the Safety Assessment SR-Site, "SKB(Svensk Kärnbränslehantering AB)", SKB, ~, pp.SKB TR-10-45 (2010)
- Safety Case for the Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel at Olkiluoto-Models and Data for the Repository System 2012, "Posiva Oy.", POSIVA, ~, pp.POSIVA 2013-01 (2013)
- Geosphere Process Report for the Safety Assessment SR-Site, "SKB", SKB, ~, pp.SKB TR-10-48 (2010)
