대통령 경호책임자의 월권사례 분석을 통한 경호제도 개편 방안에 관한 연구

Abstract

In Korea's modern history, Kwak Young-joo, head of security for the Rhee Syng-man regime, and Cha Ji-cheol, head of security for the Yushin regime, are representative figures who have exceeded the security chief’s authority of the presidential security agencies. Through their close relationship with the president, they abused power and illegally accumulated money, which led to the end of the regime itself. This research will analyze the institutional reasons for the negative history of presidential security and the problems of operating the system and look for the solution that the presidential security office would perform the natural security service without interfering in political issues. Firstly, as to the presidential security system in the First Republic, security service was treated as a part of the police service. However, there was no law for carrying out security services, which could not control the police power abuse. Owing to this aspect, the security officers were able to misuse the power due to their closeness with the president. Next, it is found that the security agency of the Yushin regime was legitimately placed under the presidency and assigned an excessively high ministerial rank. That system provided institutional conditions for making it the president's private soldier and tyranny. The history of the presidential bodyguards' abuse of authority suggests that strong control of power is needed to control interference in political affairs, secondly, treating presidential security as police work, and thirdly, ways to block the closeness between the president and the presidential security officer. Consequently, the following conclusions could be reached: A fine legal basis is needed to prevent the presidential security agency from abusing its authority power and political intervention, prevent the president from his appointing the head of the agency, grant the police commission the power, and significantly lower the position to prevent abuse and control. This will make it easier to control power over security officers, prevent security agencies from becoming political institutions, and prevent security agencies from becoming private power for the president. In this way, the police's security experience, human and material organizations and facilities will be well utilized to carry out efficient presidential security tasks that can also be expected to save the national budget.