러시아의 중앙아시아 복귀

Abstract

On October 18, 2004, Russian President Putin said, “It is Central Asia that will determine the future geopolitical map of Eurasian continent,” enlightening the world on the sensitivity of the region. Russia's role as Central Asia's principal security manager is in doubt. Moscow was happy to see the destruction of the Taliban, and Putin has scored diplomatic gains (most notably a more understanding attitude in the West toward Russian military operations in Chechnya) in return for Russian cooperation. But if there is no timetable for the departure of American troops from Central Asia, Moscow is likely to perceive the U.S. response to terrorism as little more than an excuse to extend American military presence into the region, which Russian strategists have portrayed since the end of the nineteenth century as the country's soft underbelly. Russia has always attached great strategic importance to Central Asia particularly as a buffer zone against possible influence and expansion of the Islamic movements and due to the interests related to the richresources of the area, and to a strong Russian human presence mainly in Kazakhstan. It Is thus evident that Moscow sees the new republics as its “special neighbors.” Founding the Commonwealth of independent States on 8 December 1991 was an effort to make these newly independent republics integrated on an “Oil -Gas Union model” but on the new basis. Similarly, during the last decade Russia tried to maintain a kind of military solidarity by concluding the Collective Security Treaty in May 1992 and to ensure advantageous economic relations.