朱熹的告子和陸九淵的告子 ――以對“不動心”的詮釋爲中心
Two Gaozi: Zhu Xi’s Gaozi and Lu Jiuyuan’s Gaozi
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朱熹主張陸九淵之學有類於告子者之處不勝枚舉，那陸九淵是否同意此種說法？陸九淵1181年與朱熹相會於南康白鹿洞書院之後許久，又於1188年寄予朱熹書信一封｡信中提及，二人在南康相會時曾就告子之不動心展開過論爭｡依此可見，陸九淵不但瞭解朱熹對告子不動心的解說，還不苟同朱熹將自己稱爲告子的說法｡若根據現存文獻重構雙方的解釋，便可知雙方不但對告子不動心之含義的理解迥然相異，而且還依其各自的理解而批判對方爲告子｡兩人對告子不動心之含義的解釋差異，導源於對不動心的基本理解的差異｡朱熹將不動心解釋爲不惑，不動心不只是沒有恐懼，還是沒有疑惑｡因此朱熹強調知言-窮理，並主張知言優先於養氣｡相反，陸九淵將不動心當成了爲“三十而立”所做的工夫，即確保道德主體性的工夫｡然而，陸九淵在討論不動心時，僅僅依據養氣而論，卻未依據知言而論｡而且他也並未論及與知言相關聯的“人類道德性起源於何處”與“道德主體性如何確立”等問題｡考察陸九淵討論知言的段落可知，知言乃知人的前提，知人並非是瞭解他人外在所展現的行爲，而是瞭解他人的德性，而且知人的目標在於明確把握並批判世上錯誤的理論和行爲｡因而對陸九淵而言，知言在對道的明確理解(即明道)之後，是已經確立道德主體性者的工夫｡大概陸九淵認爲，在通過養氣來確立道德主體性之後才能知言｡這樣的解釋上的差異爲王夫之、黃宗羲等傳統註釋家所繼承，也深深影響了唐君毅、李明輝、David S. Nivison等人的解釋｡
Abstract
Zhu Xi 朱熹 draws a parallel between the philosophies of Lu Jiuyuan 陸九淵 and of Gaozi 告子 more than several times. Would Lu agree to this supposed similarity? In an epistle to Zhu Xi written in 1188, Lu describes their debate over Gaozi’s unmoved mind (budongxin 不動心) which took place in 1181 at the Bailudong 白鹿洞 Academy in Nankang 南康. According to this epistle, the two expressed conflicting views on the earlier philosopher so strongly as to call each other “Gaozi” in an offensive manner. This dissension largely results from their dissimilar interpretations of the concept of budongxin. Zhu Xi interprets this concept as buhuo 不惑 which means not only fearless but more importantly no doubt or query. Therefore, Zhu Xi emphasizes “understanding words” (zhiyan 知言) and “penetrating the principle” (qiongli 窮理), and argues that one should first understand words before nurturing one’s qi (yangqi 養氣). In contrast, Lu Jiuyuan understands budongxin as a method of moral cultivation to attain Confucius’s “standing firmly at thirty” (sanshi er li 三十而立). In other words, it is a way of establishing oneself as a true moral agent. Unlike Zhu, Lu makes no mention of zhiyan when he discusses budongxin; he only refers to yangqi. As a result, he fails to explain where human morality originates from, and how one establishes oneself as a moral agent. According to Lu, understanding words is a prerequisite for knowing others (zhiren 知人). Knowing others does not mean understanding one’s outward actions but it means perceiving the true virtue (de 德) of others. Its aim is to fully grasp and rightly criticize false theories and actions. Therefore, according to Lu, one can understand words after completely understanding dao 道, that is, after succeeding in moral cultivation. In other words, Lu believes that one can understand words only after one becomes a true moral agent by nurturing qi. The different positions between Lu and Zhu are inherited and further analyzed by Wang Fuzhi 王夫之 and Huang Zongxi 黃宗羲 respectively, and exert profound influence on many traditional annotators as well as modern scholars such as Tang Junyi 唐君毅, Li Minghui 李明暉, and David S. Nivison.
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