조기개입조치로서 은행의 조기퇴출과 자본확충의 비교
A Comparison between Early Closure and Recapitalization as Early Corrective Actions
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초록
본 연구는 부실 가능성이 있는 은행에 대한 조기개입정책이 은행의 위험선택에미치는 영향을 이론모형을 통해 분석하고 있다. 본 연구에서는 조기개입정책으로조기퇴출과 자본확충의 두 가지 형태를 고려한다. 분석결과 조기퇴출 정책을 선택하는 경우 은행의 위험수준이 낮아지기는 하지만 최적(first-best)수준 이하로낮아져 비효율적인 결과를 만들어 내었다. 한편 자본확충을 선택하는 경우 은행이 선택하는 위험수준을 최적수준으로 유도할 수 있으며 사회후생의 관점에서 볼때 긍정적 영향이 있는 것으로 분석되었다. 일부에서는 감독용인을 방지하기 위해 조기퇴출 형태의 강력한 조치를 지지하기도 하지만 현실적으로는 자본확충이이루어지는 경우가 많다. 본 연구의 분석은 은행퇴출 형태의 강한 안정화 조치보다 자본확충이 현실적으로 많이 선호되는 것에 대한 이론적 설명이 될 수 있다.
Abstract
This paper theoretically analyzes how early corrective actions on troubled banks affect bank risk-taking behavior. Early corrective actions considered in this paper are classified into two categories: early closure and recapitalization. Early closure might be preferable to save explicit costs(deposit insurance fund)and suppress excessive risk-taking incentives, but there are implicit costs of early closure. When the regulatory authority chooses early closure as the early corrective action, banks take low risk level, which is, however, lower than the first-best level. On the other hand, when recapitalization is chosen as a corrective measure, the authority is able to induce banks to choose the first-best risk level. And also recapitalization is preferable from the social welfare point of view. Recapitalization gives better ex ante expected returns for banks than early closure, so that there is Pareto improvement. The analysis of this paper can be a theoretical explanation why recapitalization is more frequently observed than early closure as corrective actions for troubled banks.
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