A general equilibrium model of trilateral trade with oil duopoly
0
조회
0
다운로드
0
인용
0
참고문헌
키워드
초록
I study the economic implications of the world oil market dominated by OPEC and non-OPEC major oil producing countries using a general equilibrium model of trilateral trade with oil duopoly. There are three countries and three goods, x, y, and oil (z). Home (H) is endowed with good x . Foreign (F) is endowed with good y and also produces oil (z). Middle (M) is an oil producing country and supplies oil only. I consider two types of oil market structure; (1) Cournot duopoly and (2) perfect competition. I find that Foreign is actually worse off under Cournot duopoly despite being a duopolist for wide range of parameter values that reflect real world situations. This is mainly due to reduced consumption of oil and reduced value of good y endowment under duopoly when Foreign is a net oil exporter or oil autarky, and is also due to worsening terms-of-trade effect under duopoly when Foreign is a net oil importer. Welfare reversal with higher welfare of Foreign under oil duopoly occurs only under highly unrealistic parameter values, and hence the main results of the study remain robust
Abstract
I study the economic implications of the world oil market dominated by OPEC and non-OPEC major oil producing countries using a general equilibrium model of trilateral trade with oil duopoly. There are three countries and three goods, x, y, and oil (z). Home (H) is endowed with good x . Foreign (F) is endowed with good y and also produces oil (z). Middle (M) is an oil producing country and supplies oil only. I consider two types of oil market structure; (1) Cournot duopoly and (2) perfect competition. I find that Foreign is actually worse off under Cournot duopoly despite being a duopolist for wide range of parameter values that reflect real world situations. This is mainly due to reduced consumption of oil and reduced value of good y endowment under duopoly when Foreign is a net oil exporter or oil autarky, and is also due to worsening terms-of-trade effect under duopoly when Foreign is a net oil importer. Welfare reversal with higher welfare of Foreign under oil duopoly occurs only under highly unrealistic parameter values, and hence the main results of the study remain robust
참고문헌 (10)
- BP p.l.c, "BP Statistical Review of World Energy.London", ~ (2003)
- Cox, J.C, "Learning to play Cournot duopoly strategies", Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 36, pp.141~161 (1998)
- Dowrick, S, "von Stackelberg and Cournot duopoly: choosing roles", Rand Journal of Economics, 17, pp.251~260 (1986)
- Lambertini, L, "Prisoners’' dilemma in duopoly (super) games", Journal of Economic Theory, 77, pp.181~191 (1997)
- Lucas, R.E. Jr, "Interest rates and currency prices in a two-country world", Journal of Monetary Economics, 10, pp.335~359 (1982)
- Nero, G, "A structural model of intra European union duopoly airline competition", Journal of Transportation and Policy, 30, pp.137~155 (1996)
- Rees, R, "Collusive equilibrium in the Great Salt duopoly", Economic Journal, 103, pp.833~848 (1993)
- Singh, N, "Price and quantity competition in a differentiated duopoly", Rand Journal of Economics, 15, pp.546~554 (1984)
- von Stackelberg, H, "The theory of the market economy. Translated from German and with an Introduction by A.T. Peacock. William Hodge and Company Limited" (1952), United Kingdom
- United Nations, "National accounts statistics: analysis of main aggregates 2001. New York", ~ (2003)