암 위험인식과 암보험 가입-역선택 가능성-
Recognition of Cancer Risk and Consumption of Cancer Insurance-Possibility of Adverse Selection-
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초록
우리나라의 경우 암 발병률과 암으로 인한 사망률이 높고, 암환자의 의료비용과 실직으로 인한 소득상실 리스크가 높아 암보험에 대한 국민들의 의존도가 높다. 암보험에 대한 높은 국민들의 의존도는 암보험시장의 급격한 성장으로 이어졌으나 높은 손해율로 인해 암보험 판매가 일시 중단되기도 하였다. 하지만 암보험의 높은 손해율에 대해서는 아직까지 구체적으로 연구되어진 바 없다. 이론적인 결과가 제시하듯 본인의 암 발생 위험에 대해 보험회사보다 잠재가입자가 더 많은 정보를 보유하고 이러한 정보가 실제로 암 가입 행태로까지 연계된다면 보험회사가 암 발생률과 검진율을 정확히 예측하더라도 보험회사의 손해율은 예상보다 높아질 수밖에 없다. 이에 본 연구는 암보험 잠재가입자들의 주관적인 암 발생 위험도에 따른 암보험 가입행태를 실증적으로 분석하였다. 보험가입자의 행태를 분석하기 위해서는 패널자료의 활용이 필수적이며 특히 선택편의 문제를 통제하는 것이 중요하다. Propensity Score Matching기법을 패널자료에 적용하여 분석한 결과, 일반 국민들에 대해 암 발생 위험도를 높게 평가하고 있더라도 암보험에 가입하는 경향은 나타나지 않았다. 하지만 흥미롭게도 본인의 암 발생 위험도에 대해 높게 평가하고 있는 사람들은 실제로 암보험에 더 많이 가입하고 있으며, 암 발생 위험도가 암보험 가입에 미치는 영향이 통계적으로도 상당히 유의한 것으로 나타났다.
Abstract
People tend to depend on the cancer insurance, provided by the insurers since burdens of high medical costs and risk of losing a job, caused by high cancer morality and prevalence rage. Although the market size of cancer insurance has increased rapidly, the insurers have stopped providing the cancer insurance due to the high loss ration. It has been implicitly concluded that the high loss ratio in the cancer insurance is caused by the high cancer prevalence rate and active examination of the cancer without definite studies. As indicated by the results with theoretical analyses, the loss ratio could be higher than the potential loss ratio expected by the insurers if there exists adverse selection caused by the asymmetric information between the insured and insurers about the potential insured’s health status. This study aims to investigate whether the potential insured apply their private information about the possibility of facing cancer diseases for consuming a cancer insurance. In order to investigate empirically the behaviors of the potential insured, it is essential to control the endogeneity such as selection bias using a panel data. The results from the propensity score matching analysis show that the high likelihood of getting cancer estimated based on the general population does not lead to consumption of cancer insurance. However, interestingly, the high likelihood of getting cancer estimated based on themselves leads to consumption of cancer insurance.
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