미국·EU 항공자유화(Open Skies)협정과 경쟁법상의 제문제
US·EU Open Skies Agreement and Its Legal Implications With Respect to Competition
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The United States has, over the past few decades, steadfastly advocated the need for open-skies agreements with its partners in aviation. For its part, the EU has also made progress. That the European Commission has concluded horizontal agreements so far with Australia, New Zealand, and Singapore, all of which were initialed in 2005. The European Commission has also asked the Council of the EU to grant more comprehensive negotiating mandates for the creation of open aviation areas with Australia, China, and New Zealand. The European Commission has also been conferred a horizontal mandate to replace certain specific provisions in the existing bilateral agreements declared contrary to Community law. Irrespective of the difficulties arising from the transition from a traditional and entrenched bilateral method of negotiation, both the United States and EU have forged ahead towards their goal of open skies with an impressive list of precedent. The collective position of these two giants is rife with complex realities of competition and cannot be compared with other nations that might place open skies on a bilateral negotiation table and consider it a done deal if the other party accepts. Nor can the US/EU open their territories to unlimited and untrammeled open skies. There has to be a sense of where the two parties are headed when capacity, pricing, and frequency are open. This direction should address the outcome of open skies and the various exigencies that might follow, such as complexities in slot allocation, national interest, possible carrier alliances, and secondary business stemming from open skies. All inhibitors to open skies, notwithstanding the overall benefits of liberalization, must outweigh the consequences of protectionism. As one commentator has stated, when all is said and done, "every argument against open skies is an argument in favor of protecting some airline or other against competition on the flip side of capacity dumping and predatory pricing you find a smashing deal for the markets in and out of the country, more business and tourist travelers, more goods moving by air, hotels flourishing, the overall economy better off and everybody's happy."
Abstract
The United States has, over the past few decades, steadfastly advocated the need for open-skies agreements with its partners in aviation. For its part, the EU has also made progress. That the European Commission has concluded horizontal agreements so far with Australia, New Zealand, and Singapore, all of which were initialed in 2005. The European Commission has also asked the Council of the EU to grant more comprehensive negotiating mandates for the creation of open aviation areas with Australia, China, and New Zealand. The European Commission has also been conferred a horizontal mandate to replace certain specific provisions in the existing bilateral agreements declared contrary to Community law. Irrespective of the difficulties arising from the transition from a traditional and entrenched bilateral method of negotiation, both the United States and EU have forged ahead towards their goal of open skies with an impressive list of precedent. The collective position of these two giants is rife with complex realities of competition and cannot be compared with other nations that might place open skies on a bilateral negotiation table and consider it a done deal if the other party accepts. Nor can the US/EU open their territories to unlimited and untrammeled open skies. There has to be a sense of where the two parties are headed when capacity, pricing, and frequency are open. This direction should address the outcome of open skies and the various exigencies that might follow, such as complexities in slot allocation, national interest, possible carrier alliances, and secondary business stemming from open skies. All inhibitors to open skies, notwithstanding the overall benefits of liberalization, must outweigh the consequences of protectionism. As one commentator has stated, when all is said and done, "every argument against open skies is an argument in favor of protecting some airline or other against competition on the flip side of capacity dumping and predatory pricing you find a smashing deal for the markets in and out of the country, more business and tourist travelers, more goods moving by air, hotels flourishing, the overall economy better off and everybody's happy."
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