‘자기인식’에 관한 유식학파와 중관학파의 논쟁

Abstract

This paper is composed with the theory of self-cognition(svasaṃvedana). The theory of self-cognition has developed with the theory of sākāravādin. It is insisted that the object of cognition is not the external object, but we can only recognize the ākāra which appears in awareness. The ākāra could be said the cognition itself. Therefore all the cognition is the reflexive awareness, namely 'the self-cognition'. Since Dignāga made an issue what is the object of cognition, Dharmakīti unfold the theory of ākāra, based on the epistemology of Sautrāntika and Yogācāra. And then he came to conclusion 'the theory of self cognition'. Yogācāra and Mādhyamaka became to controvert on the theory of self-cognition. For Yogācāra the self-cognition is regarded as Vijñaptimātratā in terms of the negation of external objects. For Mādhyamaka it is explained everything doesn't have its nature(niḥsvabhāva) and can not exist in itself. So they naturally criticized Yogācāra's theory, especially the self-cognition. It is worth while to notice whether the Mādhyamaka disapproved self-cognition on the level of paramārtha or saṃvṛtti. The Prasaṇgika such as Candrakīrti insisted it couldn't exist in common expression(vyavahāra). But Śāntarakṣita who was the latter Mādhyamika showed the receptive attitude. He said that as long as it does not strictly examined on the level of paramārtha, it could be approved. What is the self-cognition? Maybe it doesn't mean something that exist in entity(dravya). Rather it could be said a character of reflexive in awareness. Why the Yogācāra could not but defence the self-cognition? Why the Mādhyamaka could not but criticize the self-cognition? It seems that the debate of self-cognition connected with the Buddhist theoretical system between Yogācāra and Mādhyamaka. Śāntarakṣita undoubtedly disapproved the self-cognitionon the level of paramārtha, however it seems not to be considered his negation on the level of saṃvṛtti.