샹카라의 지행회통(知行會通) 비판에 대한 고찰

Abstract

Śaṅkara acknowledges only jñāna as the mokṣa-dharma. In the point of view, it is thought that the doctrine of the Bhagavadgītā, which emphasizes in no small measure karma or bhakti, has given a dilemma to him. Though the Bhagavadgītā suggested two paths/arts of karma and bhakti as well as jñana, the first target of criticism was karma. No wonder the jñāna-karma-samuccayavāda, which asserts that through the unification of jñāna and karma can achieve the mokṣa, was embraced generally by people before his age (and of course after him as well). I examined how Śaṅkara criticized the jñāna-karma-samuccayavāda and then whether his criticism has validity. At first, Śaṅkara criticized that in the Bhagavadgītā 3.3, Kṛṣṇa presented jñāna and karma for the people who have different readiness(根機, adhikāra) respectively. Therefore, he asserted that those two cannot be united/amalgamated each other. Nevertheless, his double-subjected theory cannot be called as samuccayavāda. Because saying that jñāna and karma are applied respectively is just a strategy for criticizing the samuccayavāda and it does not mean that he regards those two subjects are equal. Secondly, he claims that jñāna is superior than karma. He provides the verses in the Bhagavadgītā 3.1 in which can be read as “if you think that jñāna is superior than karma,” as a reasonable evidence of his opinion. However, it shows a logical fallacy. Because the question of Arjuna in that verse is not a uttarapakṣa(後論) or siddhānta(正說), but a mere pūrvapakṣa(前論) which would be denied by Kṛṣṇa. It is not persuasive because he tried to make a siddhānta of Bhagavadgītā based on the position of Arjuna, not Kṛṣṇa. Therefore, Against his opinion, in the Bhagavadgītā 3.3, Kṛṣṇa mentions that contending for superiority between those two is meaningless by saying “[perfection of] reflective person is made by jñāna-yoga, and [perfection of] yogins are made by karma-yoga”. Śaṅkara comprehends the difference in readiness as an unequal hierarchy, not the difference in preference/aim. According to him, the pair of ‘reflective person vs yogin’ transforms into ‘one who knows the truth vs one who does not know the truth’. His understanding is not only away from the fundamental purpose(tātparya) of Bhagavadgītā but also kind of obsession with readiness itself, and I rechristen such attitude as ‘readiness-ism’. Though I think ‘consideration of readiness’ is necessary and has educational value, the ‘readiness-ism’ should be differenciated with it because it is uninstructive/anti-instructive. Thirdly, Śaṅkara subdivides the readiness of ‘renunciation of karma’, which is occurred as a component in the pair of ‘renunciation of karma vs karma-yoga’ in the Bhagavadgītā 5.2, into ‘one who knows ātman vs one who does not know ātman’. After that, he says that one who knows ātman can achieve bliss, but one who doesn’t know cannot. It means that he stands against the stance of the Bhagavadgītā 3.3 in which asserts “Both renunciation [of karma] and karma-yoga are capable of achieving bliss.” Moreover, Bhagavadgītā even shows that “Of the two, karma-yoga is superior than renunciation of karma.” I understand that the first half of Bhagavadgītā 5.2 presents the fundamental purpose(tātparya) and the last half shows the method(upāya) for the purpose. Though jñāna-karma-samuccayavāda is the fundamental purpose of the Bhāgavadgītā, in this context, saying that “karma-yoga is superior than renunciation of karma” might emphasize on the significance of karma. Therefore, the verse 5.2 stands directly opposite side of Śaṅkara who asserts only jñāna denying jñāna-karma-samuccaya. After all, we could find many contradictions and fallacies in Śaṅkara’s criticism on jñāna-karma-samuccayavāda. Of course in his position as an advaita Vedānta scholar, giving a criticism on jñāna-karma-samuccayavāda could be inevitable. However his interpretation on the Bhagavadgītā, in that context, was rather a distortion of original intention of the text.