The Validity of Robinsonian Critiques on Nāgārjunian Logic - Centering on the Interpretation of Catuṣkoṭi -
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The aim of this paper is to see whether Robinson and Kajiyama’s critiques of Nāgārjuna’s discourse of catuṣkoṭi, as contradicting formal logic, while following a dialectical formula is plausible. According to them, the 3rd koṭi is a violation of the law of non-contradiction, while the 4th koṭi, a violation of the law of excluded middle. Yet, since catuṣkoṭi can be interpreted as containing different perspectives in its expression of each koṭi, the critique of violating the law of non-contradiction fails. Further, should a proper presupposition be added, the problem of excluded middle is resolved. Owing to the presence of this premise postulated as a real entity possessing intrinsic nature, it becomes perfectly valid, irrespective of all-out refutation of every option, In this context, catuṣkoṭi can be seen as an ‘expedient’, representing different views of separate schools or perspectives without violating the principle of formal logic, nor postulating any hierarchical dialectics elevating into the higher grades among these koṭis. Likewise, catuṣkoṭi in Nāgārjuna can be viewed as revealing the absurdity of postulating any identity or precondition for causal relations in perceiving intrinsic substance.
Abstract
The aim of this paper is to see whether Robinson and Kajiyama’s critiques of Nāgārjuna’s discourse of catuṣkoṭi, as contradicting formal logic, while following a dialectical formula is plausible. According to them, the 3rd koṭi is a violation of the law of non-contradiction, while the 4th koṭi, a violation of the law of excluded middle. Yet, since catuṣkoṭi can be interpreted as containing different perspectives in its expression of each koṭi, the critique of violating the law of non-contradiction fails. Further, should a proper presupposition be added, the problem of excluded middle is resolved. Owing to the presence of this premise postulated as a real entity possessing intrinsic nature, it becomes perfectly valid, irrespective of all-out refutation of every option, In this context, catuṣkoṭi can be seen as an ‘expedient’, representing different views of separate schools or perspectives without violating the principle of formal logic, nor postulating any hierarchical dialectics elevating into the higher grades among these koṭis. Likewise, catuṣkoṭi in Nāgārjuna can be viewed as revealing the absurdity of postulating any identity or precondition for causal relations in perceiving intrinsic substance.
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