The Validity of a Robinsonian Interpretation of the Nāgārjuna’s Logics of Catuṣkoṭi : Comparing Prasaṅga with Hegel’s Dialectics
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Kajiyama Yuich understands Nāgārjuna’s logics of catuṣkoṭi in terms of Hegelian Dialectics, while interpreting the negation formula of 4th koṭi in tetralemma as the religious truth of Madhyamika, which cannot be negated as an ultimate truth. And Richard Robinson also posits this proposition as dissolving the entire dr̥sti. Examining these approaches, this thesis argues against the dialectical interpretation of catuṣkoṭi with reference to its logical structure. For this, reference will also be made to Piṇgala and Candrakīrti’s commentary comparing them to Robinson’s and Kajiyama’s. Here, focus will be put on the aspect of ‘perspectives.’ Upon further examination, it was determined that a Hegelian dialectical approach is not plausible for interpreting Nāgārjuna’s logic, which is purely negative and skeptical in its character. And through reformulating the structure of catuṣkoṭi in terms of prasaṅga, this paper compares it with a dialectical formula to more clearly evaluate the implication of negative logic for catuṣkoṭi. Thereby, it was seen that Nāgārjuna has neither equated propositions on the basis of identity, nor postulated any hierarchy through classifying the grade of these koṭis. Accordingly, on the strength of various perspectives, any proposition in the catuṣkoṭi can be understood with logical clarity, without positing any metaphysical or dialectical interpretation. Further, the possible reconstruction of Nāgārjuna’s understanding of the tetralemma supports a semantic approach to truth, while revealing the absurdity of perceiving identity or causal relations as possessing intrinsic substance.
Abstract
Kajiyama Yuich understands Nāgārjuna’s logics of catuṣkoṭi in terms of Hegelian Dialectics, while interpreting the negation formula of 4th koṭi in tetralemma as the religious truth of Madhyamika, which cannot be negated as an ultimate truth. And Richard Robinson also posits this proposition as dissolving the entire dr̥sti. Examining these approaches, this thesis argues against the dialectical interpretation of catuṣkoṭi with reference to its logical structure. For this, reference will also be made to Piṇgala and Candrakīrti’s commentary comparing them to Robinson’s and Kajiyama’s. Here, focus will be put on the aspect of ‘perspectives.’ Upon further examination, it was determined that a Hegelian dialectical approach is not plausible for interpreting Nāgārjuna’s logic, which is purely negative and skeptical in its character. And through reformulating the structure of catuṣkoṭi in terms of prasaṅga, this paper compares it with a dialectical formula to more clearly evaluate the implication of negative logic for catuṣkoṭi. Thereby, it was seen that Nāgārjuna has neither equated propositions on the basis of identity, nor postulated any hierarchy through classifying the grade of these koṭis. Accordingly, on the strength of various perspectives, any proposition in the catuṣkoṭi can be understood with logical clarity, without positing any metaphysical or dialectical interpretation. Further, the possible reconstruction of Nāgārjuna’s understanding of the tetralemma supports a semantic approach to truth, while revealing the absurdity of perceiving identity or causal relations as possessing intrinsic substance.
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