이일다(離一多) 논리를 통해 고찰한 쫑카빠의 중도관

Abstract

This text critically examines the philosophical distinctions between the proponents of 'rang bzhin gyis grub pa' (essential existence) in the conventional truth level, specifically those aligned with the Svātantrika and the Prāsaṅgika schools. The analysis aims to elucidate the convergence between these perspectives and Tsongkhapa's Middle Way through the application of the ‘logic of neither one nor many entity’. The Prāsaṅgika school, affirming essential existence embed a notion of substantive concepts seeking existential validity within the object itself in the conventional level. Conversely, the Svātantrika’view phenomena as mere designation, lacking any actual existence. Through the ‘logic of neither one nor many entity’, this examination seeks to unveil how Tsongkhapa's Middle Way engages with these differing perspectives. Tsongkhapa, employing the ‘logic of neither one nor many entity’, aims to establish a nuanced Middle Way view by scrutinizing the philosophical disparities between the Svātantrika and the Prāsaṅgika schools. The logic, originally established to dismantle substantialism in Indian philosophy, is reinterpreted to critique flawed analyses that fall short of effectively negating the intended object category. He believed that, to establish a proper Middle Way View, it is crucial to accurately recognize the types of objects negated by the concept of Emptiness (śūnyatā). Therefore, the concept of ' essential existence' endorsed by the proponents of the autonomous argument, according to Tsongkhapa leaves a flaw in their assertion of non-substantiality. He evaluates the non- substantiality posited by the proponents of the autonomous argument as an incomplete perspective that fails to fulfill the necessity of removing the non-substantiality from the viewpoint of the reductio ad absurdum argument. By utilizing ‘logic of neither one nor many entity’, Tsongkhapa demonstrates a unique feature—maintaining a Middle Way perspective by rigorously critiquing fallacies arising from the negation of experiential phenomena at the conventional level. This logical framework, infused with reductive elements, allows Tsongkhapa to articulate a Middle Way that transcends the twofold extremes. In summary, this text employs the ‘logic of neither one nor many entity’to dissect the philosophical differences regarding 'rang bzhin gyis grub pa' at the conventional level and to illuminate how Tsongkhapa's Middle Way is intricately connected to these perspectives. The reinterpretation of the logic showcases Tsongkhapa's innovative use of traditional philosophical tools to navigate the complexities of essential existence within the Middle Way framework.