쫑카파의 무자성에 대한 논의 __언설의 무자상 중심으로__

Abstract

This study aims to examines Tsong kha pa’s theory that non-acceptance of establishment a self-characteristic (rang gi mtshan nyid, svalakṣaṇa) even in transactional- pragmatic usage(vyavahāra) which is proceeding by means of a reasoned knowledge(rigs shes) that ascertainment on the ultimate truth. Madhyamaka philosophical theory is based on the canonical sources of the Prajñāpāramitā doctrine shown to be empty(śūnya) of self-existence (svabhāva) also known as the non-substantiality(niḥsvabhāvatā) of all things(dharma) and is designated as the Niḥsvabhāvavāda, Śūnyatāvāda. Considering then the Mādhyamaka refrain from taking up position definable in terms of divide conceptual thinking polarized into binary(positive, negative). Therefore of fundamental importance in Madhyamaka’s philosophy is essential for penetrating a reasonal logic with wordly surface-convention and ultimate real which can be known only directly negate in the object all hypostatized conceptual proliferation(prapañca). For Tsong kha pa´s views of the whether or not acceptance of the self-nature established by self-characteristic in transactional-pragmatic usage which is a basic difference between the Svātantrika and Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamikas. The beginning of Tsong kha pa illuminated by Bhāvaviveka acceptance of establishment self-characteristic in transactional-pragmatic usage relate with the dependent nature(paratantra) in his Prajñāpradīpa. But according to Prāsaṇgikas, no acceptance of a self-nature established by self-characteristic even transactional-pragmatic usage. Being discussed of the concept of svalakṣaṇa-siddha that one to hold that a svalakṣaṇa is apt for ’own specific defining characteristic’ in the Abhidharma, for ‘particular characteristic’ in the Pramāṇa school. In order to explain own theory Tsong kha pa criticize Svātantrikas’s tenet that pramāṇa postulated in virtue of a self-characteristic which is proceeding by means of a right knowledge(pramāṇa) that is only sensory cognition(dbang po’i shes pa) and which does not therefore entail analytically investigating the object of ultimate. Conclusion that ‘reasoned knowledge(rigs shes)’ is one of the central concepts in Tsong kha pa’s theory of knowledge and liberation and in understanding the topic of the object of which analytically investigating the ultimate(mthar thug dpyod pa’i rigs shes) that is the sense of paramārthasatya which shows that a sensory cognition apprehending innate existence is conceiving has no validity and then of ascertainment reality(tattva) in the Ārya’s natural wisdom of meditative equipoise(mnyam gzhag, samāhita jñāna).