도입주체에 따른 인터넷경로의 도입효과

Abstract

The Census Bureau of the Department of Commerce announced in May 2008 that U.S. retail e-commerce sales for 2006 reached $ 107 billion, up from $ 87 billion in 2005 - an increase of 22 percent. From 2001 to 2006, retail e-sales increased at an average annual growth rate of 25.4 percent. The explosive growth of E-Commerce has caused profound changes in marketing channel relationships and structures in many industries. Despite the great potential implications for both academicians and practitioners, there still exists a great deal of uncertainty about the impact of the Internet channel introduction on distribution channel management. The purpose of this study is to investigate how the ownership of the new Internet channel affects the existing channel members and consumers. To explore the above research questions, this study conducts well-controlled mathematical experiments to isolate the impact of the Internet channel by comparing before and after the Internet channel entry. The model consists of a monopolist manufacturer selling its product through a channel system including one independent physical store before the entry of an Internet store. The addition of the Internet store to this channel system results in a mixed channel comprised of two different types of channels. The new Internet store can be launched by the independent physical store such as Bestbuy. In this case, the physical retailer coordinates the two types of stores to maximize the joint profits from the two stores. The Internet store also can be introduced by an independent Internet retailer such as Amazon. In this case, a retail level competition occurs between the two types of stores. Although the manufacturer sells only one product, consumers view each product-outlet pair as a unique offering. Thus, the introduction of the Internet channel provides two product offerings for consumers. The channel structures analyzed in this study are illustrated in Fig.1. It is assumed that the manufacturer plays as a Stackelberg leader maximizing its own profits with the foresight of the independent retailer’s optimal responses as typically assumed in previous analytical channel studies. As a Stackelberg follower, the independent physical retailer or independent Internet retailer maximizes its own profits, conditional on the manufacturer’s wholesale price. The price competition between two the independent retailers is assumed to be a Bertrand Nash game. For simplicity, the marginal cost is set at zero, as typically assumed in this type of study. In order to explore the research questions above, this study develops a game theoretic model that possesses the following three key characteristics. First, the model explicitly captures the fact that an Internet channel and a physical store exist in two independent dimensions (one in physical space and the other in cyber space). This enables this model to demonstrate that the effect of adding an Internet store is different from that of adding another physical store. Second, the model reflects the fact that consumers are heterogeneous in their preferences for using a physical store and for using an Internet channel. Third, the model captures the vertical strategic interactions between an upstream manufacturer and a downstream retailer, making it possible to analyze the channel structure issues discussed in this paper. Although numerous previous models capture this vertical dimension of marketing channels, none simultaneously incorporates the three characteristics reflected in this model. The analysis results are summarized in Table 1. When the new Internet channel is introduced by the existing physical retailer and the retailer coordinates both types of stores to maximize the joint profits from the both stores, retail prices increase due to a combination of the coordination of the retail prices and the wider market coverage. The quantity sold does not significantly increase despite the wider market coverage, because the excessively high retail prices alleviate the market coverage effect to a degree. Interestingly, the coordinated total retail profits are lower than the combined retail profits of two competing independent retailers. This implies that when a physical retailer opens an Internet channel, the retailers could be better off managing the two channels separately rather than coordinating them, unless they have the foresight of the manufacturer’s pricing behavior. It is also found that the introduction of an Internet channel affects the power balance of the channel. The retail competition is strong when an independent Internet store joins a channel with an independent physical retailer. This implies that each retailer in this structure has weak channel power. Due to intense retail competition, the manufacturer uses its channel power to increase its wholesale price to extract more profits from the total channel profit. However, the retailers cannot increase retail prices accordingly because of the intense retail level competition, leading to lower channel power. In this case, consumer welfare increases due to the wider market coverage and lower retail prices caused by the retail competition. The model employed for this study is not designed to capture all the characteristics of the Internet channel. The theoretical model in this study can also be applied for any stores that are not geographically constrained such as TV home shopping or catalog sales via mail. The reasons the model in this study is names as “Internet” are as follows: first, the most representative example of the stores that are not geographically constrained is the Internet. Second, catalog sales usually determine the target markets using the pre-specified mailing lists. In this aspect, the model used in this study is closer to the Internet than catalog sales. However, it would be a desirable future research direction to mathematically and theoretically distinguish the core differences among the stores that are not geographically constrained. The model is simplified by a set of assumptions to obtain mathematical traceability. First, this study assumes the price is the only strategic tool for competition. In the real world, however, various marketing variables can be used for competition. Therefore, a more realistic model can be designed if a model incorporates other various marketing variables such as service levels or operation costs. Second, this study assumes the market with one monopoly manufacturer. Therefore, the results from this study should be carefully interpreted considering this limitation. Future research could extend this limitation by introducing manufacturer level competition. Finally, some of the results are drawn from the assumption that the monopoly manufacturer is the Stackelberg leader. Although this is a standard assumption among game theoretic studies of this kind, we could gain deeper understanding and generalize our findings beyond this assumption if the model is analyzed by different game rules. 2008年5月美国商务部统计显示，美国电子商务零售总额从2005年的870亿美元增长到2006年1070亿美元，2001年到2006年增长了22%，年均增长率达到了25.4%。这种爆发性的增长在许多行业导致了营销渠道关系和结构的显著变化。尽管这一变化对于学术界和实践者都有很大的潜在意义，分销渠道管理中的互联网渠道推介仍然存在很大的不确定性。本研究将调查新的互联网渠道所有权如何影响现有的渠道成员和消费者。为了更好的探索，本研究设计了控制实验，通过对比进入互联网渠道之前和之后来隔离互联网渠道的影响。 模型: 模型包括一个在进入互联网商店之前通过一个实体商店销售产品的垄断厂商。这个互联网商店的加入形成了一个两种渠道的混合模式。新的互联网商店可以通过实体商店来发布，如百思买。在这一案例中，实体商店的销售者联合两种商店来最大化这两种商店的总体利润。这个互联网商店也可以通过独立的网络商家推介，如亚马逊。在这个案例中，零售层面的竞争发生在两种商店之间。尽管生产商只提供一件产品，但是消费者在各自的货架上看到独立的推介。这样互联网渠道推介向顾客提供了两种产品推介。 研究假设生产商是一个“Stackelberg”领导者，它在最大化自身的利润的同时优化独立零售商的反应。作为“Stackelberg”的跟随者，在生产商提供的批发价条件下，独立的实体零售商或互联网零售商最大化他们的利润。独立的零售商之间的价格竞争假设为纳时博弈。简化起见，边际成本为零。本研究建立了有以下特征的博弈理论模型。首先，模型明确了互联网和实体商店作为两个维度：一个在物理空间，另一个在虚拟空间。这样就能使模型显示增加一个互联网商店和增加一个实体商店的差异。其次，模型反映消费者在选择实体商店和互联网商店的偏好上是不同的。第三，模型反映了上游的生产商河下游的零售商之间垂直的战略互动。 结论与讨论:当新的互联网商店由现有的实体零售商推介，而且零售商整合两种商店来最大化两种商店的整体利润，合作的零售价和更广泛的市场覆盖面提高的零售价格，但销售量却没有显著增长。因为过高的价格一定程度上抵消了市场占有率的影响。而这种情况下的整体利润反而比两个独立的竞争商店的利润之和要少。这就意味着在不考虑生产商定价行为的情况下，的当实体零售商开辟互联网渠道，零售商应该分别管理两种渠道，而不是整合他们。研究还发现，互联网渠道的推介影响渠道的平衡。独立的互联网商家加入到另外的独立实体商家的渠道会加剧零售环节的竞争。这意味着，每个零售商者在这一结构中只有微弱的渠道力量。由于激烈的零售竞争，生产商用他的渠道权力提高批发价，从整个渠道利润中获得更多的利润。而零售商却因为激烈的零售竞争不能提高零售价，导致渠道权力弱化。而消费者的福利由于市场覆盖率的增加和零售价的降低而受益。 研究局限和未来:工作本模型没有反映全部互联网渠道特征。本模型还可以用于其他不受地理限制的商店形式，如家庭电视购物和邮寄目录销售。未来研究可以引入竞争的生产商条件。通过改进博弈的假设条件，希望能获得更深入和更一般化的结论。