Explaining and Theorizing Development:Historical Structures and Strategic Preferences in the Comparative Political Economy of the Middle East and North Africa
0
조회
0
다운로드
1
인용
0
참고문헌
키워드
초록
In explaining the determinants and variations of development, both rational choice and historical institutionalism share an assumption about the prominent role of the state which constrains actors' perceptions and choices. However, historical institutionalist approach is more successful in providing the state as an active and primary role and in focusing on the diversity of institutional arrangements rooted in its own historical structures and situations. In most developing countries, particularly the Middle East and North Africa, the incumbent regimes do not allow space for societal actors in order to keep their invested interests. Therefore, it is plausible to suppose the role of the state as an initial condition in causal explanation of power asymmetries and settings. As a minimal condition for development, the state should possess at least quasi-pluralist structures where societal actors can have room for maneuver. As a maximum condition, the state should hold responsive autonomy through which the state facilitates a mutual interaction between the state and society in promoting development. Given these conditions, political reform or institutional transformation should be preceded or at least accompanied with economic reform. Otherwise, it is quite unlikely that the prospects of structural adjustment reform in the region show greater possibilities to succeed.
Abstract
In explaining the determinants and variations of development, both rational choice and historical institutionalism share an assumption about the prominent role of the state which constrains actors' perceptions and choices. However, historical institutionalist approach is more successful in providing the state as an active and primary role and in focusing on the diversity of institutional arrangements rooted in its own historical structures and situations. In most developing countries, particularly the Middle East and North Africa, the incumbent regimes do not allow space for societal actors in order to keep their invested interests. Therefore, it is plausible to suppose the role of the state as an initial condition in causal explanation of power asymmetries and settings. As a minimal condition for development, the state should possess at least quasi-pluralist structures where societal actors can have room for maneuver. As a maximum condition, the state should hold responsive autonomy through which the state facilitates a mutual interaction between the state and society in promoting development. Given these conditions, political reform or institutional transformation should be preceded or at least accompanied with economic reform. Otherwise, it is quite unlikely that the prospects of structural adjustment reform in the region show greater possibilities to succeed.
참고문헌 (56)
- Reevaluating the Modernization Hypothesis, "Acemoglu, Daron", NBER, ~, pp.No. W13334 (2007)
- Amsden, Alice, "Asia's Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization" (1989), Oxford University Press
- Ayubi, Nazih N., "Over-stating the Arab State" (1995), I. B. Tauris
- Bates, Robert, "Open-Economy Politics" (1997), Princeton University Press
- Bates, Robert, "Prosperity and Violence: The Political Economy of Development" (2001), W.W. Norton & Company
- Bellin, Eva, "The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective", Comparative Political Studies, 36(2) (2004)
- Bellin, Eva, "Stalled Democracy: Capital, Labor, and the Paradox of State-Sponsored Development" (2002), Cornell University Press
- Boix, Carles, "Introduction. in: The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics" (2007), Oxford University Press
- Boone, Catherine, "Political Topographies of the African State" (2003), Cambridge University Press
- Brownlee, Jason, "Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization" (2007), Cambridge University Press
- Bueno de Mesquita, "The Logic of Political Survival" (2003), MIT Press
- Caporaso, James A., "Theories of Political Economy" (1998), Cambridge University Press
- Collier, David, "Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Research", World Politics, 49(3) (1997)
- Collier, Paul, "The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries are Failing and What Can Be Done About It" (2007), Oxford University Press
- Evans, Peter, "On the Road toward a More Adequate Understanding of the State. in: Bringing the State Back In" (1985), Cambridge University Press
- Evans, Peter, "Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation" (1995), Princeton University Press
- Frank, A. Gunder, "Latin America: Reform or Revolution" (1974), Fawcett
- Fukuyama, Francis, "Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity" (1996), Free Press
- Galbraith, James K., "The Macroeconomics of Income Distribution. in: Inequality and Industrial Change" (2001), Cambridge University Press
- Granato, Jim, "Cultural Values, Stable Democracy, and Economic Development: A Reply", American Journal of Political Science, 40(3) (1996)
- Hall, Peter, "Political Science and the New Three Institutionalisms", Political Studies, 44(5) (1996)
- Hall, Peter, "Preference Formation as a Political Process: The Case of Monetary Union in Europe. in: Preferences and Situations: Points of Intersection between Historical and Rational Choice Institutionalism" (2005), Russell Sage Foundation
- Henry, Clement M., "Globalization and the Politics of Development in the Middle East" (2001), Cambridge University Press
- Inglehart, Ronald, "Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy: The Human Development Sequence" (2005), Cambridge University Press
- Jang, Ji-Hyang, "Weak State, Weak Civil Society: The Politics of State-Society Relations in the Arab World", The Journal of International and Area Studies, 16(1) (2009)
- Katznelson, Ira, "Intersections Between Historical and Rational Choice Institutionalism. in: Preferences and Situations: Points of Intersection between Historical and Rational Choice Institutionalism" (2005), Russell Sage Foundation
- Knight, Jack, "Institutions and Social Conflict" (1992), Cambridge University Press
- Levi, Margaret, "Inducing Preferences Within Organizations: The Case of Unions. in: Preferences and Situations: Points of Intersection between Historical and Rational Choice Institutionalism" (2005), Russell Sage Foundation
- Levi, Margaret, "Of Rule and Revenue" (1988), University of California Press
- Leys, Colin, "The Rise and Fall of Development Theory" (1996), James Currey
- Lichbach, Mark, "Research Traditions and Theory in Comparative Politics: An Introduction. in: Comparative Politics; Rationality, Culture, and Structure" (1997), Cambridge University Press
- Mahoney, James, "Combining Institutionalisms: Liberal Choices and Political Trajectories in Central America. in: Preferences and Situations: Points of Intersection between Historical and Rational Choice Institutionalism" (2005), Russell Sage Foundation
- Mahoney, James, "Knowledge Accumulation in Comparative Historical Research: The Case of Democracy and Authoritarianism. in: Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences" (2003), Cambridge University Press
- North, Douglass, "Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance" (1990), Cambridge University Press
- North, Douglass, "Structure and Change in Economic History" (1981), W. W. Norton & Company
- Owen, Roger, "State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East" (2004), Routledge
- Peters, Guy, "Institutional Theory in Political Science" (2005), Continuum
- Polanyi, Karl, "The Great Transformation" (1944), Farrar & Rinehart
- Posusney, Marsha Pripstein, "The Middle East's Democracy Deficit in Comparative Perspective. in: Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Regimes and Resistance" (2005), Lynne Rienner
- Przeworski, Adam, "Modernization: Theory and Facts", World Politics, 51(2) (1997)
- Przeworski, Adam, "Democracy and the Market" (1991), Cambridge University Press
- Putnam, Robert, "Making Democracy Work" (1993), Princeton University Press
- Richards, Alan, "A Political Economy of the Middle East" (2008), Westview Press
- Rodrik, Dani, "Good-Bye Washington Consensus, Hello Washington Confusion?", Journal of Economic Literature, 44(4) (2006)
- Ross, Marc Howard, "Culture and Identity in Comparative Political Analysis. in: Comparative Politics; Rationality, Culture, and Structure" (1997), Cambridge University Press
- Rudra, Nita, "Globalization and the Strengthening of Democracy in Developing World", American Journal of Political Science, 49(4) (2005)
- Sachs, Jeffery D., "Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth", Development Discussion Paper, Harvard Institute for International Development, (517) (1995)
- Sachs, Jeffery D., "The Curse of Natural Resources", European Economic Review, 45(4) (2004)
- Schneider, Ben Ross, "Business, the State, and Economic Performance in Developing Countries. in: Business and the State in Developing Countries" (1997), Cornell University Press
- Shapiro, Ian, "Introduction. in: Rethinking Political Institutions: The Art of the State" (2007), New York University Press
- Snider, Lewis, "Growth, Debt, and Politics" (1996), Westview Press
- Stiglitz, Joseph, "Capital-Market Liberalization, Globalization and the IMF", Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 20(1) (2004)
- Thelen, Kathleen, "Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics. in: Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism In Comparative Analysis" (1992), Cambridge University Press
- Wallerstein, "The Modern World System" (1976), Academic Press
- Weingast, Barry, "Persuasion, Preference Change, and Critical Junctures: The Microfoundations of a Macroscopic Concept. in: Preferences and Situations: Points of Intersection between Historical and Rational Choice Institutionalism" (2005), Russell Sage Foundation
- Wolf, Martin, "We Need More Globalisation", The Financial Times (2004)