『 코리오레이너스』 에 나타난 책임의 문제

Abstract

This essay reads Shakespeare’s Coriolanus by drawing on Derrida’s account of the paradoxical structure of responsibility in The Gift of Death. According to Derrida, responsibility operates in the incompatible conflict between generality and singularity; one ought to act irresponsibly in order to fulfill an absolute responsibility, as best shown in Biblical Abraham who tried to sacrifice his only beloved son Isaac to be absolutely responsible for God. Shakespeare’s Coriolanus shows a structural similarity with Abraham in that the Roman warrior takes the absolute responsibility for Rome while not answering to all other calls, especially a call from Roman populace. From Coriolanus’ perspective, the Roman plebeians cannot represent Rome as it is due to their mutability. Rome is one thing and its populace is another. The representation of Rome ought to be invariably consistent with Rome itself. Otherwise responsibility, which presumes the self sameness of being, is not possible in the first place. This is why Coriolanus opposes the Roman populace and later noble Romans as well; he acts irresponsibly in response to their calls to retain his absolute responsibility for Rome. However, Coriolanus’ absolute sense of responsibility for Rome begins to collapse, as it collides with another responsibility for his family. In other words, he finds himself doubly bound to the two incompatible responsibilities, both of which are absolute in their own right, thereby revealing that responsibility operates only in the annulment of the call to which it ought to answer.