자진신고자 감면제도하의 담합 게임에 대한 균형분석모형 개발
Developing an Equilibrium Analysis Model of Cartel Game under Leniency Programs
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This study is to develop a mathematical analysis model to grasp the behaviors of cartels. Cartels are formed tacitly and causetremendous damage to consumers in modern society which is composed of advanced industry structure. The government authoritieshave instituted the leniency programs to respond cartels. However, cartels will continue unless there are legal sanctions againstcartels based on an accurate analysis of leniency programs. The proposed cartel equilibrium analysis model is a mathematicalbehavior model which is based on the existing methods and the prison’s dilemma of game theory. Therefore, the model hasa form of pay off matrix of two players. We use a iterated polymatrix approximation (IPA) method to deduct a Nash equilibriumpoint. The model is validated by an empirical analysis as well.
Abstract
This study is to develop a mathematical analysis model to grasp the behaviors of cartels. Cartels are formed tacitly and causetremendous damage to consumers in modern society which is composed of advanced industry structure. The government authoritieshave instituted the leniency programs to respond cartels. However, cartels will continue unless there are legal sanctions againstcartels based on an accurate analysis of leniency programs. The proposed cartel equilibrium analysis model is a mathematicalbehavior model which is based on the existing methods and the prison’s dilemma of game theory. Therefore, the model hasa form of pay off matrix of two players. We use a iterated polymatrix approximation (IPA) method to deduct a Nash equilibriumpoint. The model is validated by an empirical analysis as well.
참고문헌 (16)
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