부당공동행위의 적발유인제도 ― 자진신고자 감면제도를 중심으로 ―
A Study on the Incentives for Cartel Informants － Focused on the Leniency Program －
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Hardcore cartels including price fixing, output restriction and bid- rigging are widely considered the most anticompetitive violations. It is, however, difficult to detect covert cartels due to asymmetry of information between competition authorities and cartel participants. Accordingly, to offer cartel informants incentives is helpful for resolving asymmetry of information. It's the aim of the leniency program and the rewards program for cartel informants. In particular, many countries including US and EU have improved the leniency programs recently, which have been remarkably activated. The greatest virtue of the leniency program is to prevent cartels structurally by creating distrust among cartel members. In that regard, this paper surveys and evaluates the current Korean leniency program along with those of other key jurisdictions, and proposes some improvements. Among them, it suggests that we provide leniency only to the first appli- cant, introduce the individual leniency and the anonymous hypothetical application, and enhance the confidentiality policy. Especially for the confidentiality, we need to review EU law and discussions.
Abstract
Hardcore cartels including price fixing, output restriction and bid- rigging are widely considered the most anticompetitive violations. It is, however, difficult to detect covert cartels due to asymmetry of information between competition authorities and cartel participants. Accordingly, to offer cartel informants incentives is helpful for resolving asymmetry of information. It's the aim of the leniency program and the rewards program for cartel informants. In particular, many countries including US and EU have improved the leniency programs recently, which have been remarkably activated. The greatest virtue of the leniency program is to prevent cartels structurally by creating distrust among cartel members. In that regard, this paper surveys and evaluates the current Korean leniency program along with those of other key jurisdictions, and proposes some improvements. Among them, it suggests that we provide leniency only to the first appli- cant, introduce the individual leniency and the anonymous hypothetical application, and enhance the confidentiality policy. Especially for the confidentiality, we need to review EU law and discussions.
참고문헌 (20)
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