협동조합의 조합원 가치와 거버넌스에 관한 고찰

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to analyze theoretically the weakness of corporate governance of cooperatives and to propose strategies for strengthening governance. The objective of cooperatives cited in agricultural cooperative law could motivate the inefficiency of cooperative management. Some characteristics of cooperatives such as one member-one vote rule and owner=customer relationship may become sources of the weakness of corporate governance. The multi-business system with non-profit principle produces the agency problem of managers of non-financial business divisions. Strategies for improving corporate governance should be based on the objective redefined as the maximization of membership value. Including non-member stakeholders in the governance of cooperatives improves internal governance because of their higher incentive to monitor management. For preventing the agency problem of managers in non-financial business divisions, the evaluation and disclosure of performance compared with competing firms within their industries should be required. Risk-based rules for deposit insurance and capital adequacy enhance soundness of cooperative management. And the national federation’s role as external governance is crucial to make up for the lack of market discipline.