성과급 지급방식이 종업원의 임금에 관한 선호도에 미치는 영향 : 행동경제학의 임금협상 분야 적용에 대한 탐색적 연구

Abstract

This study, assuming that different wage negotiations may bring in different levels of employees' pay satisfaction, verified the difference in preferences and satisfaction depending on the way of paying incentives and applied the behavioral economy to the wage negotiation table. In concrete, the purpose of this study is to examine, in the course of wage negotiations, the effects of the framed time condition and the gain/loss condition against an employee on choices and judgments. The results for the time condition are as follows: For the linear condition assuming a neutral circumstance where there was no time frame, Hypothesis I-1 was established putting the deduction condition on top of the add condition in preference, on the basis of a theoretical background where a selection would be made in terms of loss aversion. But the hypothesis was rejected. With respect to the initial-weighted incentive condition with a near future time frame, Hypothesis II-1, saying that the add condition would be more preferred than the deduction condition was supported. However, regarding the last-weighted incentive condition with a far future time frame, a hypothesis Hypothesis III-1, saying that the deduction condition would be more preferred than the add condition was rejected. However, the selection rate for the deduction condition showed a gradual increase as the early condition, the comparison condition, and the last condition appeared in order (Hypothesis IV was supported). Looking into the results of the gain/loss context, Hypothesis V-1, saying that the initial-weighted incentive condition would be more preferred than the last-weighted one with respect to the add condition (gain context), was supported. Also supported was Hypothesis VI-1, saying that the last-weighted incentive condition would gain more preferences than the initial-weighted one with respect to the deduction condition (loss context). Hypothesis VII assumed that the selection of the two initial-last weighted conditions may vary according to the employee's actual goal achievement. As a result, the hypothesis received partial support as it turned out to have been significant only in the deduction condition. Based on these results, the time frame in the wage negotiation table can be interpreted to impose moderate effects on the employee's selection and judgment. Also, the gain/loss context had stronger effects than the time condition did. Concretely, the gain context in the near future prefers a small but certain gain, therefore preferred is a condition that presents a higher percent of incentive at the low level of goal accomplishment. As for the loss context, employees attempt to avoid a 100% sure loss the most, tend to be more sensitive to even a small loss, and have an optimistic propensity toward the future. In this respect, it turns out that the closer the employee approaches to the maximum goal, the more he/she prefers the condition of cutting down smaller incentives. As there have been no studies so far that applied the principles of behavioral economics from the perspective of wage management, this study can be exploratory. However, various implications can be obtained. First, it could understand what effects loss aversion has on the employees' negotiations. In particular, the selection rate for the last-weighted incentive condition in the loss condition was 71%, the highest of the selection rates among incentive combinations. The possibility of goal accomplishment and motivation rate for achievement effort also reached the highest level. An enterprise needs to negotiate wages for employees to maximize their performance, so they seem to prefer the last-weighted incentive condition. In this light, if either of the two initial and last weighted incentive conditions is selected from the deduction conditions in order to maximize selection, satisfaction, and motivation level while on the negotiation table, the fairness and the motivation level of the employees favored by a company will be able to rise. This may possibly act as a win-win strategy both for the enterprise and the employees as the individuals can certainly see an increase in fairness for and satisfaction in negotiations. Second, selections vary by an individual's degree of goal accomplishment. When the level of goal accomplishment is below average in the loss context, the selection rate of initial-weighted incentive condition was 14.2% higher than the last-weighted incentive. When over average, however, the last-weighted incentive condition had the higher figure of 77.3% compared to 22.7% for the initial-weighted. That is, high-performers exceeding average goals in the organization tend to prefer more risks than those who do not. It should be necessary to present a wage negotiation proposal in consideration with the employees' past goal accomplishment level history. Third, the study showed what the compensation offering time meant. That is, how the satisfaction to changes in selections and negotiation results vary, according to the compensation in the far future time frame and a certain one in the near future time frame, while the employees are at the negotiation table. The results of this study indicated they generally preferred sure profits at the present time. This is also consistent with the meta-analysis results of Kuhnerger(1999). The analysis pointed out that selecting money or personal assets turned out to have less preference for risk than other conditions. Since, it may be assumed that wages are a significant factor that influences basic family life, well-being, and many other parts, the possibility of not taking risk may come automatically. Furthermore, most Korean businesses traditionally make an additional wage payment such as general increase or bonus payment in many cases. Accordingly, the term "deduction payment" may look so salient and influential that it may have brought about some reluctance. This may have occurred due to some of the participants with families who desire to keep a stable source of income. In light of all these factors, subsequent studies on wage negotiations need to fully consider the variables stated. Finally, it is encouraging to have revealed the fact that the leading theories of behavioral economics have been applied to wage negotiations, and it is of great significance to an individual. Though the theories of behavioral economics are also explained in existing wage management theories, no empirical evidence has been presented under the current circumstances. Findings of this study, therefore, are considered to be helpful for the theoretical aspects in the existing wage management. In spite of these implications, there are some limitations for generalizing the results of this research First, a researcher arbitrarily established the percentage for the incentive negotiation conditions presented by this study. Though the maximum weight was set at 10 percent for the maximization of independent variable effects, it would have been better to investigate the actual percentage applicable to businesses and reflect it in the study. It is therefore necessary to look into the last-weight percent actually applicable in following studies. If possible, it would be beneficial for businesses to set the percentage by writing concrete functions in a calculable method. Second, detailed investigations have not been conducted toward the fairness, satisfaction, possibility of goal accomplishment, and will of performance effort. The study allowed the selection of one of two proposed incentive conditions. This selection method, though widely used for research on existing behavioral economics, could have brought in more analysis and explanations, if the Likert scale measures had been conducted in more detail over each condition or the ones chosen by individuals. This method was not completed in consideration of possible restrictions in the generalization of results. This is because the participants are likely to become less attentive to a response or have lower concentration in the later part as the number of items grows. Taking this point into account, the study did not make comparison between the linear conditions that anyone would generally think of as fair and other conditions. Following studies should consider these points and maintain the respondents' attention to access more detailed and various information. Third, variables of individual differences examined in the study were restrictive. Only demographic variables were mainly adopted for this study but it is necessary to gain further insight into influential variables on an individual's selection during the wage negotiation process. For example, wage negotiations can be influenced by an each individual's trust for the organization or pay satisfaction, so can personality (Big 5), goal orientation, and risk aversion level. Following studies will need to carry out research on variables that can affect decision-making in wage negotiations. Lastly, selection for the study was based on a scenario instead of an actual situation, so no conclusions cannot be reached whether or not consistent results would come out during actual wage negotiation circumstance. In following studies, it is necessary to observe actual wage negotiations among employees currently working. If future studies are conducted taking these limitations into consideration, they will be able to present various implications as to how behavioral economics theories can be applied in the wage negotiation process.