자동차보험 피해자에 의한 상태 검증
Costly State Verification by a Claimant in Automobile Insurance
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참고문헌
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초록
이 연구에서는 위험중립적인 자동차보험 피해자와 자동차보험회사간의 최적보상 문제를 다룬다. 전통적인 상태검증비용모형에서와는 달리 실제 손해규모는 보험회사의 사적정보로 가정한다. 즉, 피해자는 보상전문가인 손해사정사나 변호사를 고용하는 등의 비용을 들여야 실제 손해규모를 확인할 수 있다. 이러한 관점에서 보험회사의 과소보상현상을 간단한 보험금산정모형을 설정하고 게임이론을 통하여 분석한다. 중요한 결과로서 보험회사는 실손보상을 균형전략으로 채택하지 않는다는 것이다. 또한, 방어비용이나 명성손해가 예상판결금액보다 큰 경우에는 소송을 피하고 조기에 클레임을 종결하기 위해 과대보상의 가능성이 있다는 것이다.
Abstract
In this paper insurance automobile insurance claiming environment of a risk-neutral claimant and an insurer is considered. On the contrary to the usual Costly State Verification model, the actual magnitude of a loss suffered by a claimant is private information to the insurer and the claimant can verify the loss only by incurring a cost (hiring experts such as claim adjusters or/and attorneys). In this perspective the insurer's underpayment phenomenon is explained through a game theoretic approach. The analysis shows that the full indemnification strategy is not a Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium. And in the case of small losses, which are less than insurer's defense costs and reputation costs, there are possibilities of overcompensation to settle claims early without lawsuits.
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