반덤핑법에 대한 경제논리적 타당성 고찰

Abstract

If dumping causes material injury to producers in the importing country, Article VI of the GATT straightforwardly condemns it and allows discriminatory action against goods which are being dumped by a particular country. Under this regime, therefore, antidumping actions taken selectively by importing countries are perfectly legal. International trade policy rules have recognized dumping as a practice which is to be criticised for almost a century. Defenders of antidumping laws argue that just as certain domestic activities. such as monopolization, price fixing or market sharing are undesirable, certain international trade practices, such as dumping, are undesirable. Therefore, dumping should be regulated as a desire to create a level playing field where the producers of the world all have an equal chance to compete. However, by calling. dumping unfair, importing-country governments justify their attempt to restrict the market access right of exporters and the very concept of 'fairness' makes it difficult to complain about antidumping actions. The dilemma pertaining to antidumping law is that it grew up originally out of fears of predatory dumping and the notion of 'fairness', but it now functions like a quasi-safeguard law. In preventing antidumping policy from protectionist use, therefore, the crucial question is how to distinguish between the competition law characteristics and safeguard characteristics of antidumping measure. And if it is impossible to replace antidumping measures with competition law and safeguard law, then, at least the question of how to effectively constrain the misuse of the safeguard function of antidumping law arises in dealing with such problems.