병자호란 전후 우역 발생과 농우 재분배 정책

Abstract

The purpose of this study is to examine the Joseon‐era policy of redistribution of domestic cattle for overcoming the crisis in agriculture caused by rinderpest in the light of empirical research about the occurrence and spread of rinderpest in the period before and after the Second Manchu invasion of Korea (Byeongja Horan). In addition, the study revealed the accomplishments and the meanings of the importation of domestic cattle to Joseon, which faced an agricultural crisis, as a diplomatic tactic to mitigate the economic burden imposed by the peace treaty with the Manchu. The results are summarized as follows. Plowing with cattle was an agricultural method encouraged in early 17th century Joseon, and the use of oxen in agriculture expanded more than before. In these historical circumstances, Joseon implemented various measures to preserve oxen, which occupied a very important position in domestic agriculture, in order to prevent croplands from becoming rough and dry. The most preferred measure was to strengthen the woogeum(牛禁) policy that prevented farmers from slaughtering their own cattle to prevent the spread of rinderpest because of the fear that all cattle would be killed. In addition, a policy of redistributing domestic cattle that survived rinderpest was performed. The cattle redistribution was carried out under the leadership of the national governance bodies associated with the King of Joseon, and in provinces, it was performed by an officer under the command of the governor. Initially, oxen from Gangwon and Hasam provinces, where rinderpest had not spread, were redistributed to the area north of Gyeonggi province in unit of counties and prefectures, but in March of the 15th year of the reign of King Injo, rinderpest spread to Hasam province as well, so the policy focused on the redistribution of cattle from Jeju to the various provinces of the mainland. By November or December of the 15th year of the reign of King Injo, rinderpest had spread even to Jeju; thus, only 5,000 head of cattle, only half of the originally planned number, were redistributed. As rinderpest spread across the country, around August of the 15th year of the reign of King Injo, full time officers were appointed in order to introduce cattle from Daemado as well as Jeju and a diplomat was even dispatched to Japan to negotiate. However, rinderpest from Yeungnam spread through Daemado into the Kansai region, which led to the cancellation of the plan to import cattle from Japan. Joseon was able to purchase 185 head of cattle from Mongolia by quickly informing the Qing emperor about the severe domestic rinderpest, but the redistribution was carried out only in some counties and prefectures in Pyeongan and Hwanghae provinces. The introduction of cattle from Mongolia to Joseon on the special orders of the Qing emperor was not only an effective option to overcome the rinderpest which Joseon faced, but rather it was validated in diplomatic negotiations derived from the strategy to reduce various burdens that had been forced on Joseon at Ganghwa by the peace treaty with the Manchu. Both before and after the Second Manchu Invasion of Korea, Joseon strengthened the woogeum(牛禁) policy and redistributed domestic cattle in response to the rinderpest in order to prevent cropland from becoming dry and rough and to lay a new foundation for the breeding of cattle. Furthermore, the original goal to meet the demand for cattle of some areas of Gyeongsang‐do by importing cattle through Daemado was not successful, since the rinderpest had spread to Japan as well. However, through negotiations with Qing, it was possible to reduce various economic burdens that had been imposed by Qing through the import of 185 cattle from Mongolia. Therefore, strengthening woogeum, domestic redistribution of cattle, and the cattle import policies of Joseon to overcome the rinderpest occurring both before and after the Second Manchu Invasion not only helped solve the crisis on agriculture which Joseon faced, but also functioned as a tactic to resolve diplomatic problems.