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한국형 포이즌 필의 도입에 관한 연구 -2009년 12월 법무부가 입법예고한 상법 일부개정법률안에 대한 검토-

A Study on the Government's Draft Amendments to the Commercial Law to Introduce a Poison Pill Scheme into Korea

권재열
한국경영법률학회 (The Korean Academic Society Of Business Administration And Law)|2010.01|경영법률 (Journal of Business Administration & Law)|제20권 제2호|pp. 381-416

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참고문헌

키워드

적대적 M&A(hostile takeover)포이즌 필(poison pill)신주인수선택권(warrant)주주평등의 원칙(principle of shareholder equality)일몰조항(sunset provision)참호구축효과(entrenchment effect)
주제분류법학

초록

The Ministry of Justice has opened the draft amendments to the Commercial Code to the public, which are intented to adopt a poison pill against hostile takeovers. The poison pill refers a defensive tactic that curbs hostile takeover bids by making the target corporation unattractive to the potential acquirer. According to the draft amendments, a poison pill can be used only in the instance where the issuance of warrants are written into the articles of incorporation and the board of directors can decide whether to grant warrants to existing shareholders. The articles may provide that the target corporation treats shareholders on an unequal basis even if the issuance of warrants dilutes the raider's holdings. However, some kinds of loopholes remain in the draft amendments. Firstly, the government's drive to adopt the pill seems that Korea is likely to close the door of the market for corporate control to foreigners. Secondly, since the draft amendments use some abstract terms such as the corporate value and does not provide the concrete guideline for the board's prerogative of granting and redeeming warrants, the board's decisions may be under the court's ex post facto scrutiny. Thirdly, it can not be anticipated for the target corporation to cancel the issued warrants voluntarily because the re-incorporation of the poison pill into the articles after its previous cancellation is not an easy work. Fourthly, although shareholders are granted an injunction against the issuance of new shares, the newly- issued shares are not retrospectively null and void.

Abstract

The Ministry of Justice has opened the draft amendments to the Commercial Code to the public, which are intented to adopt a poison pill against hostile takeovers. The poison pill refers a defensive tactic that curbs hostile takeover bids by making the target corporation unattractive to the potential acquirer. According to the draft amendments, a poison pill can be used only in the instance where the issuance of warrants are written into the articles of incorporation and the board of directors can decide whether to grant warrants to existing shareholders. The articles may provide that the target corporation treats shareholders on an unequal basis even if the issuance of warrants dilutes the raider's holdings. However, some kinds of loopholes remain in the draft amendments. Firstly, the government's drive to adopt the pill seems that Korea is likely to close the door of the market for corporate control to foreigners. Secondly, since the draft amendments use some abstract terms such as the corporate value and does not provide the concrete guideline for the board's prerogative of granting and redeeming warrants, the board's decisions may be under the court's ex post facto scrutiny. Thirdly, it can not be anticipated for the target corporation to cancel the issued warrants voluntarily because the re-incorporation of the poison pill into the articles after its previous cancellation is not an easy work. Fourthly, although shareholders are granted an injunction against the issuance of new shares, the newly- issued shares are not retrospectively null and void.

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