독점규제법상 유통시장 규제에 관한 연구 —시장 획정 및 경쟁제한성 판단을 중심으로—
Antitrust Regulatory Framework for Distribution Market
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This article reviews the criteria for defining a relevant market and assessing anticompetitiveness in distribution industry. In the first, some insist that substitutability be assessed from the point of view of a supplier or a distributor in case that their trade is concerned. However, I think it is of no practical use or against the goal of the competition law. In the latter, on the premise that the aim of the competition law is to protect consumer welfare, the effects of buyer power on consumer benefits are analyzed in the short and long term. The result is that we can't decide whether buyer power will hinder consumer welfare. Thus, we need not make an exception of distribution market. In conclusion, it is undesirable to define a relevant market or account for anticompetitiveness by constraint so as to regulate buyer power. It is a matter of need to protect a locked-in counterpart. Korean Fair Trade Commission and courts have treated it as abuse of not dominant but superior position, and I think it's a proper approach.
Abstract
This article reviews the criteria for defining a relevant market and assessing anticompetitiveness in distribution industry. In the first, some insist that substitutability be assessed from the point of view of a supplier or a distributor in case that their trade is concerned. However, I think it is of no practical use or against the goal of the competition law. In the latter, on the premise that the aim of the competition law is to protect consumer welfare, the effects of buyer power on consumer benefits are analyzed in the short and long term. The result is that we can't decide whether buyer power will hinder consumer welfare. Thus, we need not make an exception of distribution market. In conclusion, it is undesirable to define a relevant market or account for anticompetitiveness by constraint so as to regulate buyer power. It is a matter of need to protect a locked-in counterpart. Korean Fair Trade Commission and courts have treated it as abuse of not dominant but superior position, and I think it's a proper approach.
참고문헌 (34)
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