North Korea's Nuclear Threat, The U.S.-China Hegemony Competition and South Korea's Nuclear Options During Trump 2.0
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On January 20, 2025, 20 President Donald Trump referred to North Korea as “nuclear power” and has said his openness to resuming dialogue with Kim Jung-un. On November 8, 2012, Xi Jinping, elected as General Secretary of the Party, presented the Chinese Dream of fully realizing a modern socialist country by 2050 and becoming a global powerhouse to compete for hegemony with United States. Militarily, China aims to divide the Pacific Ocean into east Pacific and west Pacific by crossing the 2nd Island Chain (Yokosuka in Japan-Saipan-Guam-Indonesia), where the United States is currently blocking China, and advancing to the 3rd Island Chain (Aleutian Islands-Hawaii-New Zealand) by 2040. North Korea will refuse any offer of its denuclearization, as it showed in the U. S.-North Korea summit conference at Hanoi for February 27-28, 2019, and maintains its denuclearization could be considered possible only after U.S. withdraws its forces from South Korea. The Korean government should shift its defense paradigm from relying on conventional weapons to a nuclear focused one to establish a balance of terror. Furthermore, Extended Deterrence, facilitated by the U.S. nuclear capabilities, would be promptly and tangibly realized. To effectively address the real and escalating threat of North Korea's nuclear and missile provocations and the intensifying U. S. - China power competition, Extended Deterrence is not enough. For these reasons several South Korea's nuclear options have been raised in the U.S. and South Korea: (1) nuclear armament under U.S. support and approval, (2) redeployment of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons, (3) the plutonium reprocessing and uranium enrichment allowed to Japan when the U.S.-Japan Atomic Energy Agreement was extended on July 16, 2018, and (4) construction knowhow of nuclear-powered submarines given to Australia on Sept. 15, 2021 when AUKUS (Australia-United Kingdom-United States) started. If one or more of the South Korea's nuclear options mentioned above have been realized rather than offering a “small deal” with North Korea, those nuclear options will greatly contribute to achieve denuclearization of North Korea and to prevent China's military expansion. South Koreans must come together with firm resolve to resist external threats and reinforce the alliance with the United States
Abstract
On January 20, 2025, 20 President Donald Trump referred to North Korea as “nuclear power” and has said his openness to resuming dialogue with Kim Jung-un. On November 8, 2012, Xi Jinping, elected as General Secretary of the Party, presented the Chinese Dream of fully realizing a modern socialist country by 2050 and becoming a global powerhouse to compete for hegemony with United States. Militarily, China aims to divide the Pacific Ocean into east Pacific and west Pacific by crossing the 2nd Island Chain (Yokosuka in Japan-Saipan-Guam-Indonesia), where the United States is currently blocking China, and advancing to the 3rd Island Chain (Aleutian Islands-Hawaii-New Zealand) by 2040. North Korea will refuse any offer of its denuclearization, as it showed in the U. S.-North Korea summit conference at Hanoi for February 27-28, 2019, and maintains its denuclearization could be considered possible only after U.S. withdraws its forces from South Korea. The Korean government should shift its defense paradigm from relying on conventional weapons to a nuclear focused one to establish a balance of terror. Furthermore, Extended Deterrence, facilitated by the U.S. nuclear capabilities, would be promptly and tangibly realized. To effectively address the real and escalating threat of North Korea's nuclear and missile provocations and the intensifying U. S. - China power competition, Extended Deterrence is not enough. For these reasons several South Korea's nuclear options have been raised in the U.S. and South Korea: (1) nuclear armament under U.S. support and approval, (2) redeployment of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons, (3) the plutonium reprocessing and uranium enrichment allowed to Japan when the U.S.-Japan Atomic Energy Agreement was extended on July 16, 2018, and (4) construction knowhow of nuclear-powered submarines given to Australia on Sept. 15, 2021 when AUKUS (Australia-United Kingdom-United States) started. If one or more of the South Korea's nuclear options mentioned above have been realized rather than offering a “small deal” with North Korea, those nuclear options will greatly contribute to achieve denuclearization of North Korea and to prevent China's military expansion. South Koreans must come together with firm resolve to resist external threats and reinforce the alliance with the United States