The Constitutional Court as a Political Crisis Manager
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While the Korean National Assembly, a symbol of representative and majoritarian democracy, was found to lack problem-solving ability on political issues that had attracted public attention, the Korean Constitutional Court emerged as a new problem- solver. A very large proportion of the high-profile cases brought for decision to the Constitutional Court involved intense political controversies which might have led to political crisis. The state of the presidential impeachment is both a crisis of democracy and a crisis of the Constitution. The resolution of the problem was concluded by the judicial judgment of the Constitutional Court, and the two governance crises in 2004 and 2016 ended in considerable stability in the fields of politics, administration, economy, and society. The Constitutional Court can help the political process and the virtuous cycle of deliberation through constitutional trials. In order for the Constitutional Court to preserve its independence in a dynamic political surroundings and continue to play the role of protecting the Constitution, it needs the development of democracy and autonomous public support and monitoring.
Abstract
While the Korean National Assembly, a symbol of representative and majoritarian democracy, was found to lack problem-solving ability on political issues that had attracted public attention, the Korean Constitutional Court emerged as a new problem- solver. A very large proportion of the high-profile cases brought for decision to the Constitutional Court involved intense political controversies which might have led to political crisis. The state of the presidential impeachment is both a crisis of democracy and a crisis of the Constitution. The resolution of the problem was concluded by the judicial judgment of the Constitutional Court, and the two governance crises in 2004 and 2016 ended in considerable stability in the fields of politics, administration, economy, and society. The Constitutional Court can help the political process and the virtuous cycle of deliberation through constitutional trials. In order for the Constitutional Court to preserve its independence in a dynamic political surroundings and continue to play the role of protecting the Constitution, it needs the development of democracy and autonomous public support and monitoring.
참고문헌 (13)
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